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Modern commercial ship hulls continue to be built with 14- to 19-millimeter-thick (0.5- to 0.75-inch) plate.The belt armor protecting the hull was over 12 inches thick and inclined at 19 degrees from vertical, to protect the ships from armor piercing shells.The thickness of the hulls of warships depends on their combat purpose. In extreme cases, it can be from 3 mm for mine warfare ships to even 650 mm on the 1941 battleship “Yamato” [1].
| Class (standard displacement) | Flight deck | Protective deck |
|---|---|---|
| Taihō (29,770 tons) | 3.1 in (79 mm) | 1.3 in (33 mm) |
| Implacable class (23,500 tons) | 3 in (76 mm) | |
| Shinano (64,800 tons) | 3.1 in (79 mm) | |
| Midway class (45,000 tons) | 3.5 in (89 mm) |
Contents
How thick is aircraft carrier armor?
The belt armor protecting the hull was over 12 inches thick and inclined at 19 degrees from vertical, to protect the ships from armor piercing shells.
How thick is the flight deck of an aircraft carrier?
| Class (standard displacement) | Flight deck | Protective deck |
|---|---|---|
| Taihō (29,770 tons) | 3.1 in (79 mm) | 1.3 in (33 mm) |
| Implacable class (23,500 tons) | 3 in (76 mm) | |
| Shinano (64,800 tons) | 3.1 in (79 mm) | |
| Midway class (45,000 tons) | 3.5 in (89 mm) |
How thick is the hull on a battleship?
The thickness of the hulls of warships depends on their combat purpose. In extreme cases, it can be from 3 mm for mine warfare ships to even 650 mm on the 1941 battleship “Yamato” [1].
What is the hull of an aircraft carrier made of?
The hull of the ship is made up of extremely strong steel plates, measuring several inches thick. This heavy body is highly effective protection against fire and battle damage.
How thick is the hull of a modern destroyer?
Modern commercial ship hulls continue to be built with 14- to 19-millimeter-thick (0.5- to 0.75-inch) plate.
How deep is the draft of an aircraft carrier?
| Class overview | |
|---|---|
| Beam | Overall: 252 ft (76.8 m) Waterline: 134 ft (40.8 m) |
| Draft | Maximum navigational: 37 feet (11.3 m) Limit: 41 feet (12.5 m) |
| Propulsion | 2 × Westinghouse A4W nuclear reactors (HEU 93.5%) 4 × steam turbines 4 × shafts 260,000 shp (194 MW) |
| Speed | 30+ knots (56+ km/h; 35+ mph) |
Why do carriers have angled decks?
The angled part of the deck allows landing aircraft to go around if necessary as well as permitting simultaneous takeoffs and landings safely when that is necessary. As I understand it (perhaps a carrier pilot could enlarge on this), a carrier pilot wants a 4G landing impact.
How thick was the Titanic’s hull?
The steel plate from the hull of the Titanic was nominally 1.875 cm thick, while the bulkhead plate had a thickness of 1.25 cm. Corrosion in the salt water had reduced the thickness of the hull plate so that it was not possible to machine standard tensile specimens from it.
How thick is the hull of the Bismarck?
Regarding underwater protection, the armor was resistant to a 250kg TNT explosive charge. Armour depth was 5.5 meters (216.5 in), with the longitudinal bulkhead thickness being 53mm (2.1 in). Overall bottom protection had a depth of 1.7 meters (66.9 in).
How thick is the hull of a ww2 destroyer?
Construction was all-welded and all decks and the upper hull were of STS, with a thickness of 0.5″ (13mm) for the main deck and 0.75″ (19mm) for the upper hull.
How thick is the armor of a destroyer?
Plates of armor 25 inches thick—the heaviest armor ever mounted on a warship—shielded the turrets of her main guns. The side of the ship could survive the impact of 3,000-pound armor-piercing projectiles like those shot from the ship’s big guns.
How high off the water is an aircraft carrier?
Depending on its aircraft load, a carrier’s flight deck may sit as high as 60 feet above the waterline. Its hangar bay elevators lower swimmers to 30 feet from the waves—the equivalent of an Olympic diving platform—so leaping sailors risk a broken bone if not using good form.
How tall is an aircraft carrier from the water?
| Class overview | |
|---|---|
| Beam | 256 ft (78 m) (flight deck) 134 ft (41 m) (waterline) |
| Height | 250 feet (76 m) |
| Draft | 39 ft (12 m) |
| Decks | 25 |
How tough is an aircraft carrier?
This Icon Of U.S. Power Is More Sinkable Than Ever But Hard To Kill Off. The new USS Gerald R. Ford is nearly 1,100 feet long, or over 3.5 football fields. It can carry nearly 5,000 people and more than 75 fighter jets with the ability to drop a million pounds of bombs a day on a target.
Why are modern warships not armored?
Since World War II, naval armour has been less important, due to the development of guided missiles. Missiles can be highly accurate and penetrate even the thickest of armor, and thus warships now focus more on anti-missile technology instead of armor.
What is a ship covered in armor called?
An ironclad is a steam-propelled warship protected by iron or steel armor plates, constructed from 1859 to the early 1890s.
Why is an aircraft carrier deck angled?
The angled part of the deck allows landing aircraft to go around if necessary as well as permitting simultaneous takeoffs and landings safely when that is necessary. As I understand it (perhaps a carrier pilot could enlarge on this), a carrier pilot wants a 4G landing impact.
A parting of the (inclined) ways
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US shipbuilding sails toward modern fabrication assembly
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A parting of the (inclined) ways
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US shipbuilding sails toward modern fabrication assembly
General Trends
Bath Iron Works
How They Build the Hull
Armoured flight deck – Wikipedia
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Design[edit]
Theory[edit]
Doctrine and design[edit]
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Defences[edit]
Midway and Forrestal classes[edit]
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The Parts of an Aircraft Carrier – Super Aircraft Carriers and their Parts | HowStuffWorks
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how thick is the hull of an aircraft carrier
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How thick is the hull of an aircraft carrier?
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How thick is aircraft carrier armor
How thick is the hull on a battleship
How thick is the metal on an aircraft carrier
How thick is the skin of an aircraft carrier
THE SHIPS HULL ULTRASONIC THICKNESS MEASUREMENT
How thick is the hull of a modern destroyer
How high off the water is an aircraft carrier
Why were carriers not in Pearl Harbor
How thick was the Titanic’s hull
How thick was the hull of the Bismarck
How thick was the hull of the USS Oklahoma
How thick are the sides of an aircraft carrier
Why are modern warships not armored
Do aircraft carriers have guns
How much jet fuel does an aircraft carrier hold
Do aircraft carriers have air conditioning
How much fuel does an aircraft carrier use per day
Can a torpedo sink an aircraft carrier
Could a storm sink an aircraft carrier
Can a missile sink an aircraft carrier
Why do aircraft carriers sit so high in the water
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How much does an aircraft carrier cost per day
The Parts of an Aircraft Carrier – Super Aircraft Carriers and their Parts | HowStuffWorks
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Nimitz-class aircraft carrier – Wikipedia
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Description[edit]
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Service history[edit]
Future and planned replacement[edit]
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A parting of the (inclined) ways
Even though boat and ship construction dates back to ancient times, some production technologies have been slow to change, illustrated by an only recent shift in technology at a major U.S. shipyard.
The building of large ships is one of the most obvious applications of heavy plate fabrication. Iron vessels first were built on a regular basis in England in the 1830s, and the first such naval fighting vessel was used in England’s First China War of 1841-43. Steel began to replace iron construction in the 1870s as steel became more affordable.
Modern commercial ship hulls continue to be built with 14- to 19-millimeter-thick (0.5- to 0.75-inch) plate. Carbon steel is low-cost and easy to repair. These materials normally are specified American Bureau of Shipping grade A, although sometimes grades B and H are used.
Early hulls were riveted, but this approach evolved to 100 percent welded seams by World War II. The submerged arc welding (SAW) process makes up the majority of welding today, using ceramic backup strips where possible to maximize one-side welding.
Double-hull construction is a fairly recent and major design change that affected fabrication and assembly. This was dictated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, with the goal of reducing the risk of major environmental disasters caused by fuel and leaking oil and petroleum cargoes. Tanker hulls must be made with double construction, while other transport vessels, such as those for containers and bulk dry cargo, must have double-hull construction only in their fuel tank areas. While the outer hull is 14 to 19 mm thick, the inner hull may be 12 to 14 mm thick.
Only the outer hull details are shaped to contour; inner hull details are designed to allow fabrication from flat plate. Power rolling shapes the outer hull components that require simple curvature, with contour checked against CAD-generated templates. Parts that need compound curvature are formed by selective heating. The latter method requires the skill and experience of craftsmen who now can refer to a CAD-generated graphic matrix, which predicts specific locations and amounts of heat to be applied.
The newest 3-D CAD software packages also can enhance productivity in other important ways. In the past, plate details were cut oversize and then hand-fitted and trimmed. Today CAD technology facilitates accurate design of net-shape details, which are cut with NC equipment driven directly from the CAD data, which also eliminates separate programming, tracer templates, or hand layout time and effort.
Another advantage of CAD technology is that shipyards that use a standardized hull design can reduce or eliminate design effort and lead-time, stretching or otherwise modifying the design to meet customer requirements.
For today’s large Navy combat vessels, aluminum is used for lighter-weight topside structure, and composites that resist corrosion are used for secondary items such as gratings and decking. However, steel continues to be the material of choice for hull structure.
General Trends
In general, Navy shipbuilders now use fewer low-carbon steel hull structures such as those that were used through World War II and more high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) steels in critical, vulnerable areas of the hull.
HSLA steel use has evolved over the last 20 to 30 years. Its advantages include increased strength and reduced thickness, which provides a weight savings that, in turn, reduces fuel consumption.
The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are an example of this evolution. Next-generation combat ship classes, such as the DDG (X) project recently initiated for development, probably will use more composite materials because of their radar avoidance characteristics and resulting stealth.
As with other industries, U.S. shipyards’ steel fabrication technology continues to change in the face of global competitiveness. Such competition is not new. The U.S. shipyards converted slowly from wooden hulls in the 1800s because of international economics. At a time when up to 50 percent of a ship’s cost was labor, U.S. skilled ironworkers were making $14 per week–44 percent more than their counterparts in Scotland–so even then the industry was pursuing labor-saving technologies.
Manufacturing and assembly technologies for heavy plate used for ship hulls have evolved significantly, if slowly, over the past 120 years or so. New materials have dictated some process changes, such as the long-ago transition from basic iron to steel plate for hulls, the use of welded rather than riveted plate joints, and use of aluminum for some topside structures.
To a great extent, the basic approach to assembly depends on how the hull will be launched, and a change in the basic approach to launch constitutes a “sea change” in the most simple shipyard facilities. This is true especially for yards that build large ships, such as commercial cargo vessels and naval combat ships.
Bath Iron Works
Competition, both domestic and foreign, is driving these changes. The U.S. has more than 280 privately owned shipyards employing nearly 100,000 workers. However, only 43 yards can handle hulls larger than 122 meters (400 feet), and only six are qualified to build combat ships for the U.S. Navy.
A prime example is Bath Iron Works (BIW) in Bath, Maine, a General Dynamics facility and one of 15 U.S. shipyards rated as having large-hull production and launch capacity. BIW launched its first ship in 1892 and has since built more than 400. Among these are 93 destroyers produced during World War II (see Figure 1).
With the Navy continuing to be BIW’s prime customer, its products have evolved through the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigates of the 1970s to today’s Aegis cruisers and the 47 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers planned for production. The next major Navy production contract could be for a batch of Zumwalt-class destroyers with an $18 billion business potential.
BIW is the largest single employer in the state of Maine, so it’s important to keep it afloat and competitive into the future. Major contracts are fewer and farther between because the Defense Department has reduced budgets and resources in the past decade and the Navy fleet has been reduced from a Reagan-era high of nearly 600 ships to 260 ships worldwide today.
Although BIW’s facility is only 56 acres, it must be able to compete with facilities like the Litton Industries’ 600-acre Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss.
How They Build the Hull
With current responsibility for both design and production of a batch of Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, BIW uses modern CAD/CAM capabilities that integrate the operations. For example, design data directly drives laser cutting of plate.
However, while advances in part fabrication processes are important, a more fundamental change is necessary to reduce overall costs—the launch process and the related buildup of the hull.
The ancient Phoenicians built their ships on a slideway that used gravity to launch the completed hull by sliding it backward into the water. Although some ships have been launched sideways rather than lengthwise, they still were built up on a cradle and released down an inclined slideway. This build-launch approach has several disadvantages.
While the Phoenicians started by laying the keel and working their way upward, most large modern ships are built up in segments or major subassemblies that are then joined to assemble the ship in lengthwise fashion. With the old-fashioned slideway approach, the ship must be assembled from the stern forward rather than starting with the largest center section and working outward to the ends.
Inclined slideway launching also involves risks, such as the ship gets stuck partway down, develops too much momentum, or even falls off the cradle. One of the biggest cargo ships built at BIW was damaged when part of the cradle collapsed during launch.
The last ship to be launched in this way at BIW was the 6,500-ton Navy destroyer Mason, which slid down the inclined slideway in June 2001. After a $547 million modernization investment, the company will assemble and launch its next ship, the USS Chafee, in the more modern approach that most other shipyards have already adopted.
The company will now build up major subsections of up to 600 tons each from smaller subassemblies and large details and then move them by crane into position onto a hydraulic train rail system, where they will be joined on a level, rather than inclined, surface. These old and new technologies overlapped: A few weeks before the Mason launch, the keel was laid for the Chafee at the dedication of the new $240 million Land Level Transfer Facility (LLTF) (see Figure 2).
When the Chafee hull is complete, launching will be less spectacular but safer and faster. A huge floating dry dock will be positioned inline with the LLTF, and the new ship will be transferred into it. The floating dry dock is 180 by 750 ft. long, itself an example of massive fabrication. It was built by Jiangdu Yuehai Shipbuilding Co., Jiangsu Province, China. Only one North American firm bid on the dry dock, and its bid was more than double that of the Chinese company’s.
The new dry dock will be winched out on submerged rails into the Kennebec River, where the dry dock will be flooded to allow the hull to float out. This process will take up to three hours, in contrast to the typical 30 seconds for an inclined slideway launch, but significant assembly productivity and cost benefits will be gained.
Using the old method, ships usually were about only 60 percent complete and had been in production up to 110 weeks at the time of launch. The new LLTF approach will allow ships to be 85 percent completed and launched in 72 weeks.
Increased efficiency comes from the fact that larger–and thus fewer–segments are involved in final assembly, and each segment is more fully pre-equipped with pipes and electrical wiring. BIW will enjoy expanded opportunity because it no longer will be restricted to a 510-ft. hull length, and three ships may be built simultaneously, side by side. Shipway 1, for example, is 1,000 ft. long, capable of building a ship 825 ft. long.
JDR Military Service
One of our P-3Bs overflying the Admiral Ushakov, the lead unit of four nuclear-powered 24,500 ton Kirov class battlecruisers completed by the Soviets between 1980 and 1996. Our four Iowa class battleships were taken out of mothballs, modernized, and recommissioned between 1982 and 1988 in response to these behemoths.
Aerial oblique view of the New Jersey firing three of her 16 inch guns (one from each turret) simultaneously, after being recommissioned for an unprecedented fourth time in December 1982. Every Naval officer wanted to get a closer look at the old battleships. I was fortunate to have actually gotten aboard the Missouri for a short stint.
The business end of the Iowa firing three of her 16-inch rifles at targets in a firepower demonstration for visiting dignitaries from Guatemala in August 1984. As I recall, the Iowa had been dispatched to Guatemala to render medical and dental assistance. Simultaneous firings did so much vibration damage to the computers aboard ship, they began firing one rifle at a time, with some interval between.
This view shows the New Jersey firing a Tomahawk cruise missile. The Iowa class battleships were reconfigured to carry 32 Tomahawk and 16 Harpoon missiles, as well as four Phalanx CWIS gatling guns. Three of four were decommissioned in the fall of 1991, following the first Gulf War. The Missouri was retained for a few more months with a reduced crew so she could attend the 50th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack ceremonies in December 1991. The Missouri had hosted the Japanese surrender in Sagami Bay near Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
I am the officer in the leather flight jacket on the bridge of the USS Missouri while the crew mans the rails as we depart San Francisco Bay following the ship’s first port call in July 1987. The Missouri’s coning tower armor was 17 inches thick, making it pleasantly cool inside during most days at sea. The belt armor protecting the hull was over 12 inches thick and inclined at 19 degrees from vertical, to protect the ships from armor piercing shells.
Propulsion on an Iowa Class battleship, as revealed in drydock. The five-bladed inboard screws were 17 feet in diameter while the 4 bladed wing screws were 18’-3” in diameter. The design power output was 212,000 shaft horsepower (shp), with a 20% overload (up to 254,000 shp). During the New Jersey’s sea trials in December 1943 the engine room generated 221,000 shp, clocking 31.9 kts with a displacement of 56,928 tons. The Iowas were the fastest battleships ever built, by a wide margin. Their design speed was about 33.5 kts (38 mph), but a lightly loaded hull (51,000 tons) would have been capable of achieving 35.4 kts (40.25 mph). That’s fast enough for waterskiing!
The Need for Speed. My sketch depicting the equations used to determine the optimal waterline length for maximum speed, presenting examples for 12 meter racing yachts (used in the America Cup races) and World War II era destroyers and cruisers/battleships. These values were empirically derived from model hull studies at the David Taylor Ship Basin in Cabin John, MD in the 1930s and 40s. The length-to-beam ratio for the Iowa Class battleships was 7.96.
In the post World War II-era naval architects established a hydrodynamic order or merit that eliminated the effect of displacement. The most common comparison was this graph comparing the “power coefficient” (shaft horsepower divided by the displacement and multiplied by the speed) against the speed divided by the square root of length ratio. The red dots are measured data for Iowa Class battleship sea trials. Note how these plot very close to the line shown for cruiser hulls.
The width of the Iowa Class battleships was limited by the dimensions of the Panama Canal locks. The maximum beam that could transit the Canal was 108-1/6 feet because the locks are 110 feet wide. This beam dimension was then multiplied by 7.96 to determine the waterline length of 860 feet. This shows the battleship Iowa transiting the Pedro Miguel Locks on June 6, 1984. Looks like a tight fit!
The Iowa Class battleships were designed to be immune from 18-inch armor piercing naval gunfire at ranges between 18,000 and 30,000 yards. Below 18,000 yards the lower trajectories of incoming shells could conceivably pierce the inclined hull armor package.
Nice shot of the Missouri positioning herself for underway refueling from the USS Kawishiwi (AO-146), a Neosho class tanker. The carrier Kitty Hawk is in the background, waiting her turn. This was taken on June 25, 1986, shortly after the Missouri was recommissioned in San Francisco (her intended homeport).
Underway replenishment between the Missouri and the stores ship USS Sylvania (FS 2), the second unit of the Mars Class ( 576 feet long with a displacement of 17,500 tons). The US Navy is designed for global mobility and sustained periods at sea. This mobility is sustained by a “invisible” fleet of stores ships and oilers that replenish the warships every few days.
The Iowa Class battleships were the smoothest riding ships I ever rode on, even in rough seas. This shows the forecastle of the Missouri breaking some large waves, as viewed from the O-6 level on the bridge, 358 feet behind the bow.
View from the O-4 level of the bridge as the 16-inch/50 caliber Mk 7 rifles of turrets one and two on Iowa are fired simultaneously. Ear protection was essential, but no matter how much you braced yourself, you always winced at the concussion of so much cordite detonating.
Another view taken from higher on the bridge of two other 16-inch rifles firing on turrets 1 and 2. These are capable of hurling projectiles weighing between 1900 and 2700 pounds 21 to 23 miles across the sea!
I am standing inside Turret No. 2 on the USS Missouri. The round tube at left is the old optical (mirror) range finder, retained as a hand-operated back-up in case the radar ever failed.
Breech of 16-inch/50 caliber rifle on the Missouri. The caliber identifies the length of the barrel: a 50 caliber gun with a 16 inch bore would give a barrel length of 50 times 16 inches, or 800 inches (66.6 feet). The longer the barrel, the more accurate the trajectory of the projectiles. The largest of the previous American battleships had employed somewhat shorter 16-inch/45 caliber rifles.
Shipboard drill using OBA’s, or Oxygen Breathing Apparatus. Every member of the ship’s crew must complete fire fighting school and know their duties and responsibilities for different kinds of threat conditions, such as battle stations or fire aboard ship.
Stern view of the Missouri firing at Iraqi targets in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm
Turrets 1 and 2 firing simultaneously. Note the 16 inch projectile just emerging from the barrel of the closest rifle! This was taken from the forecastle (foc’sul) looking aft. Previous: Carrier Service Return To Main Page Next: Tactical Training Team Questions or comments on this page?
E-mail Dr. J David Rogers at [email protected].
Armoured flight deck
An armoured flight deck is an aircraft carrier flight deck that incorporates substantial armour in its design.
Comparison is often made between the carrier designs of the Royal Navy (RN) and the United States Navy (USN). The two navies followed differing philosophies in the use of armour on carrier flight decks, starting with the design of the RN’s Illustrious class and ending with the design of the Midway class, when the USN also adopted armoured flight decks. The two classes most easily compared are the RN’s Illustrious class and Implacable class and their nearest USN contemporaries, the Yorktown and Essex classes. The Illustrious class followed the Yorktown but preceded the Essex, while the Implacable-class design predated the Essex but these ships were completed after the lead ships of the Essex class. The development of armoured flight deck carriers proceeded during World War II, and before the end of World War II both the USN, with USS Midway, and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), with Taihō and Shinano would also commission armoured flight deck carriers, while all USN fleet aircraft carriers built since 1945 feature armoured flight decks. The remainder of the IJN carrier force during World War II had unarmoured flight decks just like the Yorktown and Essex classes of the USN.
Design [ edit ]
In choosing the best design for their carriers, the British had to consider the advantages and disadvantages of hangar design. There was a choice between open or closed hangar and the position of the armour. The placing of the strongest deck affected the strength of the hull. The further apart the deck and the keel, the stronger the design. If the flight deck was placed above the main deck then it had to be built to allow for movement with expansion sections.[1] A closed hangar design was the strongest structurally and made for a lighter hull. The RN carried this concept one step further and designed the armoured flight deck to also act as the strength deck without any underlying plating, thus achieving an armoured flight deck on the lowest possible displacement.[2]
The carriers that were built with armoured decks fall into two distinct types – those with armour at the flight deck level protecting the hangar and those that only had armour for the lower levels of the ship, typically the hangar deck. The different thickness of armour, and how they were distributed, are described in the table below.
Theory [ edit ]
Armour at the flight deck level would protect the hangar deck and the aircraft stored there from most bombs. The armour of the Illustrious class was intended to protect against 1,000 pound bombs.[7] In the Illustrious class, the armoured flight deck extended for about two-thirds of the length of the ship, bounded by the two aircraft lifts (which were without the armour). The deck was closed by 4.5-inch (114 mm) armoured sides and bulkheads, forming an armoured box. The bulkheads had sliding armoured portals to allow access between the hangar and the aircraft lift. There were 3-inch (76 mm) lateral strakes of main deck armour that extended from the base of the hangar side-wall to the top of the main side belt. The latter protected the machinery, magazines and aircraft fuel and weaponry stores. The RN’s closed and armoured hangars were capable of being environmentally sealed for protection against chemical weapon attack. The armoured design meant that it would have to be attacked with Armour Piercing (AP) bombs, which have much less blast effect than higher-capacity General Purpose (GP) bombs carrying about twice the explosive amount. GP bombs also caused severe hull damage if they exploded in the water close to the hull; AP bombs, much less so.
The USN open hangar design allowed large numbers of aircraft to be warmed up while inside, theoretically reducing the time required to range and launch a strike, but storage of fuelled and armed aircraft in an unarmoured hangar was extremely dangerous:
…Captain John S. McCain of the Ranger…actually preferred a relatively small carrier, as long as it could be protected against bombing. Again and again he told the General Board that any U.S. carrier, if her flight and hangar decks were crowded with fuelled and bombed aircraft, was a potential inferno, and that friendly fighters could not guarantee the security of any flight deck…[8]
During the war, the British fitted immersion heaters to the oil tanks of their aircraft so minimal warm-up was required when they reached the flight deck.[9]
American carriers after the Lexington-class, and the earlier Japanese carriers, had their armour placed at the hangar deck, essentially treating the hangar spaces and flight deck as superstructure – making these areas very vulnerable to the blast from GP bombs and other explosions, which in turn caused massive casualties in comparison to RN designs. A bomb that struck the flight deck would likely penetrate and explode in the hangar deck, but the armour there could still protect the ship’s vitals – including the engine spaces and fuel storage. The flight deck could also possibly fuze light bombs prematurely, which would reduce the chance of them going through the hangar deck. Such a design allowed for larger, open-sided hangar bays (improving ventilation but making the ship very vulnerable to chemical weapon attack) and the installation of deck-edge elevators. USN carriers with hangar deck armour only usually had wooden decking over thin mild steel flight decks which were easy to repair. The USN moved the structural strength deck to the flight deck,[10] starting with the Forrestal class which[11] had “…an enclosed…” hangar.[12]
Aviation fuel delivery and stowage systems were extremely vulnerable. The Royal Navy stowed aviation fuel in cylindrical tanks, that in turn were surrounded by seawater. RN aviation fuel lines were purged with carbon dioxide when not in use. The USN used a similar system, which was further improved after the two navies began exchanging information in 1940. Pre-war USN and IJN carrier designs used a fuel stowage system which was not as secure as that used by the RN, but allowed for much greater stowage capacity. Several USN and IJN carriers[13] were lost due to aviation gas fume explosions.
Doctrine and design [ edit ]
The Royal Navy had to be ready to fight a war in the confines of the North Sea and Mediterranean Sea, under the umbrella of land-based enemy air forces.[7] The Royal Navy, with its extensive network of bases and colonies in the Pacific Ocean, had also to be ready to fight in the vast expanses of the Pacific, as did the USN and the IJN, but the USN and IJN did not have to worry about operating in the Mediterranean. The differences in construction were determined by doctrine that was largely driven by the different approaches to the same tactical problem: How to destroy the enemy’s aircraft carriers while surviving the inevitable counter strike. Prior to WWII the RN and USN both recognised that the dive bomber could disable the flight decks of enemy aircraft carriers:
…From about 1933 on, the Admiralty showed increasing interest in dive-bombing, as the best means of accurate delivery against small and highly manoeuvrable ships. Dive-bombing was also particularly attractive as a means of neutralizing enemy aircraft carriers, which some in the Fleet Air Arm considered their primary targets. British observers seem to have been impressed by US demonstrations…[14]
The RN was thus faced with designing a carrier that would be survivable under the conditions to be expected in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific Oceans, and before the development of effective naval radar; these conflicting demands resulted in the development of aircraft carriers whose decks were armoured against 500 lb armour piercing bombs and 1000 lb general-purpose bombs. The RN considered that an unarmoured carrier would be unlikely to be able fly off more than one deck load of strike aircraft prior to being attacked, so the armoured flight deck carriers accepted a reduction in hangar capacity to the equivalent to one deck load of aircraft.[15] USN, IJN, and some RN Fleet carriers such as Ark Royal had sufficient aircraft capacity to allow for two ranges, each equal to a full deck load[16] of strike aircraft. The RN and IJN limited their aircraft carrier’s aircraft capacity to the capacity of their hangars, and struck down all aircraft between operations. The USN, typically, used a permanent deck park to augment the capacity of their aircraft carrier’s hangars. The use of a permanent deck park appeared to give USN carriers a much larger aircraft capacity than contemporary RN armoured flight deck carriers. The flight deck armour also reduced the length of the flight deck, reducing the maximum aircraft capacity of the armoured flight deck carrier, but the largest part of the disparity between RN and USN carriers in aircraft capacity was due to the use of a permanent deck park on USN carriers.[17][18]
The Royal Navy also had the disadvantage that they entered into World War II with the Royal Navy being pitted against large, land based, air-forces whose aircraft also had superior performance to all existing naval aircraft, while the RAF’s increased demand for high performance land based aircraft, after the Fall of France, actually reduced the production and development of Fleet Air Arm aircraft. On the other hand, the RN rapidly introduced new technologies, such as radar which enhanced the defensive capability of aircraft carriers. The RN thus had to develop new operational doctrines during the war. The USN, in contrast, was able to benefit from technology transfers from the UK and the wartime experiences of the RN, which was freely shared with the USN, prior to its entry into the war, allowing it to anticipate the changes needed to prepare its carriers for the coming conflict with Japan.[19] The USN designed the armoured flight decks of the Midway-class carriers based upon an analysis of the effectiveness of RN armoured flight decks.[20] The IJN also benefited from being able to observe the effectiveness of RN aircraft carriers in action, while both the USN and IJN were able to introduce new aircraft types, prior to their entry into World War II.
Aircraft restrictions [ edit ]
All RN fleet carriers had 16 ft (4.9 m) hangar heights, except the two Implacable-class ships, which had 14 ft (4.3 m) heights, and Indomitable which had a 16 ft (4.9 m) lower hangar and a 14 ft (4.3 m) upper hangar.[21] The Illustrious class had a single 16 ft (4.9 m) high hangar that was 468 ft (143 m) long. Within the confines of ship design, and the Second London Naval Treaty to which they complied, the Indomitable and Implacable-class carriers had to accept a reduction in hangar heights (to keep the metacentric height within acceptable limits) and size, and as a result, had some restriction on aircraft types supplied via Lend-Lease. IJN carriers typically had 16 feet (4.9 m) high hangars, including Taihō and Shinano. The USN Lexington class had 20 ft (6.1 m) hangar heights while the Yorktown, Wasp, Essex, and Midway classes had 17 ft 6 in (5.33 m) hangar heights.
Defences [ edit ]
The British approach of armoured flight decks was meant as an effective form of passive defence from bombs and kamikaze attacks that actually struck their carriers, while the American carriers primarily relied on fighters to prevent the carriers from being hit in the first place. In addition, RN carriers such as Ark Royal or Illustrious had far heavier anti-aircraft (AA) outfits than their USN counterparts, up to the introduction of the USN Essex-class carriers. Ark Royal, in 1940, carried 16 x 4.5-inch guns, 32 x 40mm “Pom-pom” and 32 x 0.5 inch 0.5 inch Vickers machine guns against 8 x 5-inch, 16 x 28 mm and 24 x .5-inch guns for Enterprise, in 1940. “In wartime, however, the US Navy found the armoured carriers fascinating. After having examined HMS Formidable in 1940, the US naval attaché commented that, were he crossing the Pacific, he would prefer her to a Yorktown, the closest US equivalent, on the basis that she might carry fewer aircraft, but she would be much more likely to get there”.[22] Late in the war when the USN operated many carriers together and had improved radar, their fighter and AA defence was reasonably effective, yet both conventional and kamikaze attacks were still able to penetrate USN defences. Bunker Hill and Franklin nearly succumbed in 1945. The larger air groups (80–110 planes, vs. 52–81 for late war British ships of the Implacable-class) allowed for a more effective combat air patrol (CAP) without reducing strike capability, improving the protection of the whole battle group and lessening the workload of the carrier escorts. Carrier fighters were able to shoot down far more kamikaze aircraft than any amount of deck armour would have protected against showing the value of absolute numbers, but in the early war period IJN aircraft had little difficulty in penetrating USN CAPs; near the end of the war, veteran American fighter pilots in superior Grumman F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighters were able to defeat the young, inexperienced and ill-trained kamikaze pilots with ease and run up huge kill scores but attackers were still able to get through. (In addition to larger aircraft complements, the US Navy had larger fleets and more resources, so they could establish destroyer pickets as part of their “Big blue blanket” defense system, and develop dedicated AAW ships such as the Atlanta-class antiaircraft cruisers which would have also drawn attention away from the carriers.) On the surface, the record seems balanced.
British naval historian D.K. Brown put the practical difference between American and British design philosophies in no uncertain terms: “More fighters would have been better protection than armour,” but that British designs were good for the circumstances in which they were meant to be used.[23] Yet, even Ark Royal, Britain’s newest carrier prior to World War II, never operated close to her theoretical aircraft capacity. Prior to the development of effective radar and high speed monoplane fighters, a successful fighter defence was extremely unlikely for any navy thus calling into doubt D.K. Brown’s conclusions.[24] The benefits of flight deck armour were intended to counter these issues.[25]
Fewer aircraft meant a lower priority to attack than the more heavily armed American carriers and the RN’s operational doctrine dictated smaller airgroups, and the armoured hangar carriers had smaller avgas and ammunition supplies to match. However, RN carriers carried far more aircraft later in the war, making use of the deck park when they adopted USN style operational doctrine. The 2nd generation RN armoured carriers, Indomitable and the Implacable class which had an additional half length lower hangar, were considerably less outmatched by their USN counterparts in the numbers of aircraft operated. The RN operating in harsher weather protected their aircraft from the elements and did not use a permanent deck park in the earlier part of the war.
Damage analysis [ edit ]
US carriers and their fighters shot down more than 1,900 suicide aircraft during Operation Kikusui (the last and largest kamikaze attack in the Okinawa campaign), versus a mere 75 for the British, yet both forces suffered the same number of serious hits (four), on their carriers. However the kamikazes made 173[26] strikes against other USN targets and the 4 USN carriers suffered a massive death toll, in contrast to the relatively light casualties on the RN carriers.[27]
Formidable on fire following a kamikaze strike, Okinawa, 9 May 1945. Total casualties, 3 dead and 19 wounded.[28] HMSon fire following a kamikaze strike, Okinawa, 9 May 1945. Total casualties, 3 dead and 19 wounded.
Franklin listing, with crew on deck, due to two armor piercing bomb hits penetrating the unarmoured flight deck, 19 March 1945. Total casualties, 807 dead and 487 wounded.[28] USSlisting, with crew on deck, due to two armor piercing bomb hits penetrating the unarmoured flight deck, 19 March 1945. Total casualties, 807 dead and 487 wounded.
The kamikaze threat overall was serious, but Allied defences neutralised it, and many kamikaze strikes missed the deck armour entirely, or bounced off the decks of both British or American carriers. In some cases, kamikazes either struck glancing blows that did only superficial damage that was fixed within minutes or hours, or missed entirely, due to the poor training and poorer flight experience of their pilots. The majority of kamikazes that did inflict harm caused no more damage than they would have against smaller ships. After a successful kamikaze hit, the British were able to clear the flight deck and resume flight operations in just hours, while their American counterparts often could do the same, but not always; in some cases repairs took a few days or even months. The USN liaison officer on HMS Indefatigable commented: “When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at Pearl [Harbor]. When a kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case of “Sweepers, man your brooms.””[29][30]
American carriers of the Essex class suffered very high casualties from serious kamikaze hits, though all did survive. The ships were most vulnerable during the period just prior to and during the launching of strikes.[31] Early versions of the design also had a unified ventilation system that would transfer smoke and heat from the hangar deck to the lower decks in the event of a fire. While not a kamikaze attack USS Franklin was attacked by a dive bomber and struck by two 250 kg (550 lb) bombs, one semi-armour piercing (SAP) and one general purpose (GP), when she had 47 aircraft preparing for a strike on Honshu. Both bombs penetrated into her hangar and set off ordnance and fuel from ruptured aircraft tanks for a planned ground attack relying on GP bombs and Tiny Tim missiles, killing 724 personnel.[31] USS Bunker Hill was severely damaged by pair of kamikaze hits during preparations for an attack on Okinawa which killed 346 men. Each of these USN carriers suffered more casualties than all the British RN armoured carriers combined,[32] illustrating the life saving features of RN carrier design. Illustrious, which had the highest toll, suffered 126 fatal casualties and 84 wounded when hit by six 1100 lb bombs on 10 January 1941. The USN studied the superior defensive qualities of Royal Navy armoured carriers and this analysis is partly revealed in the damage report following the attack on Franklin on 13 March 1945:
As a result of study of damage sustained by various British carriers prior to our entry into the war, two important departures from traditional U.S. Navy carrier design were incorporated in the CVB Class, then still under development. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in an action off Malta on 1 January 1941 was hit by several bombs, three of which detonated in the hangar space. Large fires swept fore and aft among parked planes thereby demonstrating the desirability of attempting to confine the limits of such explosions and fires by structural sectionalization of the hangar space. On the CVB Class the hangar was therefore divided into five compartments separated by 40 and 50-pound STS division bulkheads extending from the hangar deck to the flight deck, each fitted with a large door suitable for handling aircraft. It is hoped that this sectionalization, in conjunction with sprinkler and fog foam systems, will effectively prevent fires from spreading throughout the hangar spaces, as occurred on FRANKLIN on 30 October and 19 March. The damage experiences of several British carriers, which unlike our own were fitted with armoured flight decks, demonstrated the effectiveness of such armour in shielding hangar spaces from GP bombs and vital spaces below the hangar deck from SAP bombs. Accordingly, the CVB Class was designed with an armoured flight deck consisting of 3-1/2-inch STS from frames 46 to 175 with a hangar deck consisting of two courses of 40-pound STS between frames 36 and 192. Although none of the CVB Class carriers were completed in time to take part in war operations, the effectiveness of armoured flight decks against kamikaze attacks was demonstrated by various carriers attached to the British Pacific Fleet. Reference (k) reports two such interesting cases. The VICTORIOUS was struck by three kamikaze aircraft, two of which ricocheted off the armoured flight deck and over the side, causing no important damage. The third carried a bomb which detonated at frame 30 starboard at the butt of the 3-inch flight deck armour with 1-1/2-inch “D” quality (equivalent to HTS) steel. It does not appear that the kamikaze actually struck the ship. The bomb detonation, however, depressed the 3-inch deck slightly but did not tear it open. On the other hand, the 1-1/2-inch “D” quality deck plating was ripped open over a total area of about 25 square feet. Two days were required for temporary repairs, at the conclusion of which the ship was fully operational. HMS FORMIDABLE was hit by two bombs, the first of which struck and detonated on the flight deck 9 feet to port of the center-line at frame 79, directly over a deep bent and at a juncture of three armoured plates. The armoured deck was depressed over an area 24 feet long and 20 feet wide. Maximum depression was 15 inches. Adjacent bents spaced 12 feet forward and aft of the point of impact were slightly depressed. A hole 2 square feet in area was blown in the 3-inch deck. Three fragments penetrated downward through the ship into the center boiler room. The damage in this boiler room, which was not described, temporarily reduced speed to 18 knots. The second bomb struck and detonated on the centreline of the flight deck at frame 94. The 3-inch deck and deep bent directly below the point of impact were depressed about 4-1/2 inches and one rivet was knocked out. However, the ship was fully operational within about 5 hours, including flight operations.[20]
Paul Silverstone in US warships of World War II notes regarding US carriers that,’vast damage was often caused by suicide planes (Kamikaze) crashing through the wooden flight decks into the hangar below’. Whereas in British carriers ‘the steel flight decks showed their worth against kamikaze attacks.'[33]
The only Allied carriers lost to a deck hit was the American Independence-class light carrier, USS Princeton and Casablanca-class escort carrier USS St. Lo (CVE-63). Indeed, many light and escort carriers were unarmoured, with no protection on the hangar or flight deck, and thus they fared poorly against deck hits.
Postwar analysis [ edit ]
What was not discovered until late in the war was that the kamikaze impacts proved to have a long-term effect on the structural integrity of some British carriers. Their postwar life was shortened, as the RN had a surplus of carriers with many in shipyards being constructed. The USN rebuilt carriers such as Franklin that had been completely gutted and the crew decimated by IJN attacks. HMS Formidable was an excellent example of this; while she weathered a severe kamikaze hit in 1945 which cratered her deck armour, the hit caused severe internal structural damage and permanently warped the hull[citation needed] (damage worsened in a postwar aircraft-handling accident wherein a Vought Corsair rolled off a lift[citation needed] and raked the hangar deck with 20mm cannon fire, causing a severe fire[citation needed]; but plans to rebuild her as per Victorious were abandoned due to budget cuts, not structural damage,[34] and she lingered in reserve until 1956 before being towed off to the breakers. However, no citation is ever given for this accident which appears to be a distorted fabrication of Formidable’s 18 May 1945, hangar fire. She carried no air group post war, and never carried the 20 mm Corsair. The Royal Navy planned to rebuild most of the armoured carriers in the early postwar period:
There seems to have been general agreement that the first ship to be modernized should be an Illustrious. Formidable was laid up and required a long refit in any case, so she was provisionally selected for modernization. Illustrious was a deck landing training and trials carrier, and could not be spared, particularly as she was needed to test the new generation of naval aircraft. This left HMS Victorious as the only other candidate. In early 1951 the other two ships of the programme were HMS Implacable, followed by HMS Indefatigable, for modernisation, respectively, 1953–55 (to relieve HMS Eagle so that she could refit in 1956 with steam catapults) and 1954–57. HMS Indomitable was scheduled for a more limited modernisation (1957) as the future deck landing training ship. At this time Eagle was scheduled for completion in August 1951 and Ark Royal in 1954, so that the full programme would provide the Royal Navy with five fleet carriers plus a semi-modernised deck landing training ship.[34]
Illustrious suffered a similar battering, especially off of Malta in 1941 when hit by German dive bombers and late in the war was limited to 22 knots (41 km/h) because her centreline shaft was disabled due to accumulated wartime damage;[35] she spent five years as a training and trials carrier (1948–53) and was disposed of in 1954. Indomitable was completely refit to like-new condition, only to suffer a severe gasoline explosion on board, which caused “considerable structural and electrical damage to the ship”.[36] Indomitable was refitted between 1948 and 1950 and served as flagship of the Home Fleet then served a tour of duty in the Mediterranean, where she was damaged by the petrol explosion. She was partially repaired before proceeding under her own power[36] to Queen Elizabeth II’s 1953 Coronation Review, before being placed in reserve in 1954.[37] Indomitable was scrapped in 1956. The explosion which occurred on Indomitable’s hangar deck, while severe, would also have caused severe casualties and extensive damage to an Essex-class carrier, several of which returned to service after hangar explosions, primarily due to the USN’s considerable financial and material resources. The postwar Royal Navy could only afford to rebuild Victorious and had to abandon plans to rebuild four other armoured carriers due to cost, and to provide crews to man the postwar built carriers, such as Ark Royal, due to reductions in manpower.[34]
Another factor is the advantage in resources that the US Navy had over the Royal Navy. The numerous and capacious American yards on the East and West Coasts allowed the US Navy to build and repair carriers at a more leisurely pace while producing ships collectively at a furious rate. The British with their strained facilities were forced to rush repairs (indeed the overloaded British shipyards had forced some vessels to be sent to the US for repairs) and some ships such as Illustrious, were forced into service even though not fully repaired. The RN was in a state of continual contraction after WWII, and simply did not have the resources or inclination to repair ships that it could no longer man.
Midway and Forrestal classes [ edit ]
While flight-deck-level armour was eventually adopted by the Americans for the Midway design, the strength deck remained on the hangar level. Midway had originally been planned to have a very heavy gun armament (8-inch weapons). The removal of these weapons freed up enough tonnage to add 3 inches (76 mm) of armour at the flight deck level. While this made a great deal of sense from an air group perspective, the Midway ships sat very low in the water for carriers (due to their much greater displacement), certainly much lower than the smaller Essex-class carriers, and had a great deal of difficulty operating in heavy seas. Flight deck armoured ships almost universally (except for the Midway class as completed) possessed a hurricane bow, where the bows were sealed up to the flight deck; wartime experience demonstrated that ships with the hurricane bow configuration (also including the American Lexington class) shipped less water than ships with an open bow. Late-life refits to Midway to bulge her hull and improve freeboard instead gave her a dangerously sharp roll, and made flight operations difficult even in moderate seas. This was therefore not repeated on Coral Sea (Franklin D. Roosevelt had been decommissioned years earlier). After the war, most of the Essex-class ships were modified with a hurricane bow and in the case of Oriskany the wooden flight deck surface was replaced with aluminium for improved resistance against the blast of jet engines, making them appear to have armoured flight decks, but in fact their armour remained at hangar level.
The supercarriers of the postwar era, starting with the Forrestal class — nearly 200 feet (61 m) longer and 40 feet (12 m) wider in the beam than their World War II counterparts – would eventually be forced to move the strength deck up to the flight deck level as a result of their great size; a shallow hull of those dimensions became too impractical to continue. The issue of protection had no influence on the change; the Forrestal class had an armoured flight deck[38][39][40][41] of at least 1.5″[42][43][44] thickness. Some of the follow-on classes to the Forrestals also had armoured flight decks[45] although deck armour is of little to no use against modern anti-ship missiles, it may help limit the damage from flight deck explosions. The experience of World War II caused the USN to change their design policy in favour of armoured flight decks:
The main armor carried on Enterprise is the heavy armored flight deck. This was to prove a significant factor in the catastrophic fire and explosions that occurred on Enterprise’s flight deck in 1969. The US Navy learned its lesson the hard way during World War II when all its carriers had only armored hangar decks. All attack carriers built since the Midway class have had armored flight decks.[46]
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