How To Beat A Battery Charge? The 128 Correct Answer

Definition of crime battery

The definition of Felony Battery is contained in Florida Statutes Section 784.041. According to the law, Felony Battery is committed when an accused actually and intentionally beats a person (without the person’s consent) causing the alleged victim “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”

Unlike grievous bodily harm, the act is not a conscious intention to cause grievous bodily harm.

Required Proof

In order to prove Felony Battery’s crime in court, the state of Florida must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following two elements:

The accused intentionally touched or hit the alleged victim against the alleged victim’s will; and The defendant, by committing the bodily harm, caused the alleged victim serious bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.

Second or subsequent offenses

In Florida, battery can also be charged as a third-degree felony (even without grievous bodily harm) if the defendant has a prior conviction of a battery felony.

Florida Statutes Section 784.03 provides the following:

A person who has a prior conviction of assault, aggravated assault, or assault and commits a second or subsequent assault commits a third-degree felony.

Penalties for Crimes Battery

Felony Battery is classified as a third-degree felony. If convicted, a defendant may be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment or five years probation and a fine of up to $5,000.00.

Other penalties in Florida may include:

claims for compensation (for medical bills and other losses incurred by the alleged victim);

community service;

substance abuse assessment and treatment;

psychological assessments and treatment;

Advisory;

In cases of domestic violence, completion of a 26- to 29-week Batterer’s Intervention Program.

Defense against crime batteries

Although no two cases are alike, there are many defenses available in Florida to help fight a felony charge. Some of the more common defenses raised in such cases are as follows:

self defense;

use of force to defend others;

use of force to defend property;

agreement or mutual struggle;

Man up;

Factual disputes about how the incident occurred;

Vengeful “victim”;

Injuries do not constitute “grave bodily harm”;

Case Study – Crime Battery

State vs. D.R.W. (Fourth Judicial Circuit, Nassau County, Florida) (2012) – Our client was charged with felony battery after allegedly hitting his father following a previous battery conviction. The incident occurred while both parties were highly intoxicated at their home and arguing over an ongoing family dispute.

After being held in the case, our lawyers spoke to two witnesses who were present at the home during the incident. One of those witnesses, who was never questioned by police, gave a conflicting account that supported a strong self-defense claim. We obtained an affidavit from the witness, provided our client with photos of an inflicted bruise, and entered into early negotiations with the prosecutor to drop the case.

Result: case dismissed.

Dismissal_Crime_Battery

importance of a lawyer

Given the numerous defenses available to a battery injury felony charge, an attorney is vital to protecting the rights of the accused and achieving the best possible outcome in a case. No one should plead any such charge without first consulting a competent attorney.

If you have been accused of Felony Battery contact Hussein & Webber, PL for a free consultation. Our attorneys handle cases throughout Northeast and Central Florida.

As Twitter debates whether Will Smith had the right to storm onstage at the Oscars and slap comedian Chris Rock in the face, current and former prosecutors under California law said the slap was clearly a misdemeanor.

But charging Smith for the battery would be a waste of time and resources, argued several experts speaking to The Chronicle on Monday.

“This is one of those incidents where nothing good would get done” if prosecuted, said Rockne Harmon, a former assistant district attorney for Alameda County who now works as an unsolved cases counsel. He and others noted that prosecutors are free to bring cases even when the crime can be easily proven.

San Mateo County District Attorney Stephen Wagstaffe pointed to Rock’s actions leading up to the violence and provoked Smith with a harsh joke about Smith’s wife.

Considering the circumstances, Wagstaffe said, “A jury would never convict (Smith) for the act.” Still, he added during a law school exam, “the student had better come to the conclusion that this constituted assault.”

In a statement, the Los Angeles Police Department admitted its investigative staff was “aware of an incident between two people during the Academy Awards program” in which one person hit another. The victim said he declined to report the matter to the police.

“If the party involved desires a police report at a later date, the LAPD is available to prepare an investigative report,” the statement said.

“Is it a felony? Absolutely,” said Michael Cardoza, defense attorney and former prosecutor for the counties of San Francisco and Alameda. He noted that although Rock failed to report the assault, prosecutors do not need a victim’s cooperation, to charge someone for battery.

Cardoza cited a jury statement that “words, no matter how shameful, do not justify hitting another person.”

Still, Cardoza doesn’t think it would be in the public interest to press charges. He also saw issues that could hamper the case, including a reluctant victim.

“It’s not significant enough to clog our courts,” Cardoza said, adding. “Public opinion will take care to punish Will Smith.”

Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón referred questions to Los Angeles District Attorney Mike Feuer, whose office handles misdemeanor cases.

A spokesman for Feuer could not immediately be reached for comment.

Rachel Swan is a contributor to the San Francisco Chronicle. Email: [email protected] Twitter: @rachelswan

Defense options in personal injury and battery cases can vary widely depending on the facts and circumstances, mainly because such cases can range from simple to extremely complex. Assuming that the basic elements of an attack/battery are in place in a case (i.e. it is not a case of mistaken identity or other basic error), the following are some possible countermeasures against attacks and battery charges, and a few listed helpful examples.

Attack and Battery Defense: Self Defense

Self-defense is probably the most commonly used defense in assault and battery cases. In general, to establish self-defense, a defendant must show:

a threat of unlawful violence or harm against you;

a genuine, honestly perceived fear of self-harm (there must be a reasonable basis for this perceived fear);

no injury or provocation on your part; and

There was no reasonable chance to withdraw or escape the situation.

Example A: Adam is confronted by Bill, a tall, imposing stranger who immediately starts shouting threats at him and lunges at him with his fists raised in the most menacing manner. Adam is horrified, punches Bill and escapes through the nearest exit at his first opportunity. Adam may be able to argue successfully that in such circumstances he acted only in self-defense.

Example B: Adam meets Bill and gets into an argument. Bill insults and belittles Adam, whereupon Adam insults Bill and threatens to beat him up. Bill then hits Adam and Adam retaliates in kind. It would be more difficult for Adam to establish self-defense under these circumstances than under Example A because Adam participated in the escalation and provocation of the fight by threatening Bill.

The doctrine of self-defense has a number of limitations in addition to those described above. Just because someone is acting in self-defense doesn’t mean all bets are off as to the amount of force that can be used in self-defense. The force used in self-defense must be proportionate to the threat posed by the victim. Even if all of the above elements are met, a person defending themselves can still be found guilty of assault/assault if the victim was not physically able to match them in the first place (this could be size, age, etc.) .

Attack and Battery Defense: Defense of others

This defense is very similar to self-defense with the only difference that the individual must have an honest and real perceived fear of harm from another person. The limitations that apply to self-defense similarly apply to the defense of others, and the accused must have had valid reasons for their perceived fear in order to substantiate that defense.

Attack and Battery Defense: Defense of property

A defendant in a personal injury/battery case may claim that they acted solely to defend their property against intruders or illegal restraint. However, it is important to note that the availability and extent of this defense varies from state to state.

Where available, these defenses generally enable an individual to use reasonable force in defense of their property, particularly where an individual’s own home is at stake. On the issue of protecting personal property, the law is more divided. In general, in disputes over personal property, the owner is not entitled to use force to recover it. On the other hand, if a person has had property stolen directly (e.g. by a pickpocket or purse thief), they may have the right to use reasonable force to recover that property.

Attack and hit defense: Agree

Depending on jurisdiction, consent may be available as a defense against an attack/battery charge. Generally, if a person has voluntarily consented to a particular act, that act cannot be invoked as assault and assault. However, if the extent of the crime exceeds the permitted allowance, it can still be grounds for bodily harm and battery punishment. It should also be noted that courts scrutinize consent as a defense and tend to find that harmful acts, even if consented, violate public policy and should still be punished by assault, assault, or other laws.

Get professional help to defend against attacks and battery charges

As you can see, there are a number of defenses available when charged with assault or assault, but these depend on the specific facts of your case. One of a criminal defense attorney’s duties is to assist in the search for evidence to establish facts in your favor at trial. It’s important to start this process early, so contact a defense attorney in your area today.

When can I be charged with the battery?

California law defines battery as “any intentional and unlawful use of force or force against” another person. You can suffer battery charges even if you don’t injure another person. In fact, the “power” required for a battery does not require a violent blow. Instead, each unwanted touch can be viewed as a battery. However, if you hit someone and cause them significant injury, you may face more serious charges.

What is a battery?

To convict you of a battery charge, a California prosecutor must show that you:

Touched another person

Intentionally

In a way that was harmful or offensive

The requirement that you intentionally touched someone means you did it intentionally. But it doesn’t mean you meant to break the law or hurt the other person. Just so you didn’t accidentally contact them.

For example, if you’re playing basketball and accidentally elbow someone while jumping to grab the ball, you haven’t committed a battery. However, if you were intentionally swinging your elbows wildly, you could be charged.

In addition, you can be charged with battery if you have only touched another person with an object. Indirect contact, when intentional, can be illegal. This applies if the contact was violent (e.g. hitting someone with a golf club) or offensive contact (e.g. hitting someone on the butt with a ping-pong bat).

How is Battery different from Assault?

While the terms personal injury and battery are often used interchangeably, they are actually different legal terms. Where the crime of physical harm criminalizes touching another person, physical harm is the act that may result in touching.

You can think of an attack as an attempted attack, since trying to hit someone can be an attack. But it’s not battery unless you actually make contact with the other person.

In California, not every touch or contact is considered a battery. Instead, the law requires the contact to be harmful or offensive. In practice, this means that the touch is violent, rude, or disrespectful. Examples of violent battery attacks include punches and kicks. A rude battery might brush your hand against someone else’s cheek. After all, a disrespectful touch could be something like a slap in the face.

Penalties for Battery in California

California law criminalizes any battery that does not cause serious injury. If you are convicted of assault, the maximum penalty includes:

Up to six months in county jail.

A fine of up to $2,000.

They can also be put on summary probation instead of going to jail. To avoid having your probation revoked, you must complete scheduled check-ins and have no other conflicts with the law.

If you end up hurting the person you hit, increased battery charges can be filed. Any serious physical injury, such as a broken bone, can lead to increased stress. Aggravated battery can be either a misdemeanor or a felony in California. If you are confronted with more serious crimes, you can serve up to four years in state prison.

Another battery-related crime is sexual battery. Any unlawful touching of another person’s privates for gratification, arousal, or abuse may result in these charges. A sexual molestation conviction requires registration as a California sex offender and carries a maximum sentence of four years in prison.

Battery charges coming up in Fullerton, California? Chambers Law Firm’s experienced legal counsel can help. Schedule a free consultation today by calling 714-760-4088 or emailing [email protected].

Prosecutors generally decide whether to bring charges against a suspect. But the victims still play an important role in the prosecution decision.

Contrary to what you see on TV, the decision to press charges doesn’t necessarily rest with the victim. The public prosecutor’s office makes the final decision on whether to bring charges. But the victim’s willingness to testify and cooperate with police and prosecutors can be critical to getting justice done.

What does it mean to press charges?

Filing a criminal complaint means filing a criminal complaint against someone who is believed to have committed a crime. These allegations may relate to someone committing an assault, damaging property, bribing an official, or stealing money. The indictment states the crimes committed, the alleged perpetrator (the accused), and the penalties for the crime.

The phrase “filing charges” gets thrown around a lot. And while every state is different, filing charges generally refers to a sequence of actions that:

a victim or someone else reports a crime to the police

the police are investigating and looking for evidence of the crime, and

The prosecutor examines the allegations and evidence and decides whether to file a criminal complaint.

The prosecutor ultimately makes the final decision on whether to press charges, but victims, witnesses, and the police all play a role in the process.

Filing a criminal complaint: How it works

The road to a criminal complaint can be longer than you would think. A victim doesn’t just walk into a police station and ask that charges be brought against someone. And it is unlikely that the police will immediately arrest and charge the suspect after receiving the victim’s statement. Unless the police are observing the crime, they must collect evidence and other information in order to recommend the prosecutor to charge the person with a crime. Let’s check.

Way of a typical arrest

In a typical scenario, a crime victim contacts the police, and the police come to the crime scene or meet with the victim and ask for information. If the suspect is at the scene and the crime has just occurred, police may be able to arrest the suspect immediately, but only if the police have “probable cause” – a reasonable belief that a crime took place and the arrested person did it . If the suspect is not at the scene of the crime, the police usually require a warrant issued by a judge before taking the suspect into custody. The police must gather information and evidence and determine if there is probable cause for an arrest warrant.

In other cases, a victim may file a police report alleging that a crime was committed against them. Similar to the scenario above, the police may need additional evidence to obtain an arrest warrant for the suspect.

Determination of the probable cause

Probable cause has no precise definition. Basically, this means that the police consider that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that a crime has taken place and that the accused has committed it. Police may consider several types of evidence and information to determine if there is probable cause for arrest, including:

Statements from the victim or witnesses who saw or heard what happened

Statements by the person accused of the crime

Physical evidence such as weapon or property damage at the crime scene

Evidence of physical injury to the victim and

Video or tape of the incident.

This evidence – if sufficient to establish a probable cause – will support an arrest or warrant application.

If the police do not arrest the offender but have evidence of a misdemeanor or petty offense (less serious offenses than a felony), the police may file a criminal complaint or other indictment document with the court. This document is mailed to the accused and requires the accused to appear in court and respond to the charges. In the case of more serious allegations (criminal offences), the police forward the evidence to the public prosecutor’s office.

Roles of the prosecutor and grand jury in indictment decisions

A prosecutor examines the police report and decides whether the government can press charges. The prosecutor must determine whether the government can prevail in court with the available evidence. To win the case, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt – a standard of proof much higher than probable cause – that the defendant committed the crime. Prosecutors have a duty to seek justice, not convictions. If the evidence does not support a conviction, the prosecutor should not press charges.

In some states, the prosecutor files criminal charges against the accused, which must then be reviewed by a judge. The judge provides a second pair of eyes to prevent the bringing of baseless charges. This verification hearing is often referred to as the probable cause or pre-hearing. Other states require the prosecutor to present the evidence to a grand jury, which decides whether there is enough evidence to go to trial. If so, the grand jury issues an indictment (in-DITE-ment) formally indicting the defendant and beginning the criminal process.

Role of the victim in bringing charges

In deciding whether to proceed with a case, the prosecutor considers the victim’s testimony and the expected level of cooperation. A victim cannot coerce or encourage the prosecutor to prosecute a case, but the prosecutor is more likely to bring criminal charges if the victim is cooperative.

The unwilling prosecutor. In some cases, a victim may want to file a criminal complaint, but the prosecutor may determine that a crime was not committed or there is insufficient evidence to stand up in court, even with the victim’s testimony. While this outcome can be very frustrating for the victim, the victim does not have the authority to make a final decision about prosecution (except in very limited circumstances, discussed below).

The involuntary sacrifice. On the other hand, a victim might object to pressing charges. This scenario can be common in domestic violence cases. The prosecutor may consider the victim’s unwillingness or refusal to testify, but ultimately the prosecutor may pursue the case even if the victim objects.

Can the prosecutor force a victim to testify in a criminal case? Prosecutors can use their subpoena powers to coerce a victim to testify (unless the victim requests the Fifth). If the person ignores the subpoena, refuses to testify, or does not appear in court, the judge may issue a bank warrant (like an arrest warrant). While a prosecutor can usually compel attendance and testimony by subpoena, the value of a reluctant or hostile witness is debatable. Victims may change or retract their testimony at the last minute, claiming they were wrong. In either case, putting an angry or hostile witness on the stand can backfire and affect the jury’s belief in the case. In some cases, the prosecutor may choose to proceed with a case without the victim’s testimony. Other evidence in the case, such as witness statements or physical evidence, may be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt.

What happens after an indictment order?

Filing a criminal complaint sets the wheels of criminal justice in motion. In the case of serious charges, the prosecutor can request an arrest warrant to ensure the arrest of the accused. The police take the accused to jail and start the booking process (fingerprints, booking photos, etc.). A bail hearing is due to take place shortly. In less serious cases, the accused may be informed of the charges by being subpoenaed and ordered to appear in court. Learn more about the steps in a criminal case – Arrest to Appeal.

Are there private criminal charges?

A few states allow individuals to file criminal complaints or charges against others for minor (minor) or misdemeanor crimes (such as trespassing or simple assault) without involving the police or prosecutors. Similarly, some states allow “private prosecutors” to hear criminal cases in certain cases.

But even in states that allow it, private indictments and prosecutions rarely occur. Courts severely limit their use, fearing that private prosecution could become a means of revenge. As mentioned above, the role of the prosecution is to seek justice, not just to condemn. A prosecutor must objectively review the evidence and make other objective decisions that can be difficult for a crime victim to step back and make.

Legal representation

If you think you have been the victim of a crime but the prosecutor or the police refuse to pursue your case, contact a local lawyer for advice on your rights and options. An attorney might suggest hiring a private investigator to look for additional evidence or make other suggestions.

Also, if you are subpoenaed to testify in a criminal proceeding and have concerns, an attorney can advise you of your rights and, if necessary, attend court with you. It is never wise to ignore correspondence from a prosecutor or the DA’s office, or a subpoena without consulting an attorney.

In Virginia, assault and assault refer to different types of crimes, and if you or someone you know has been charged with assault and assault or a related offense, a basic understanding of the law is extremely helpful. This article is intended to provide readers with an introduction to the subject, but if you have any questions about a specific situation, always consult an attorney as every case is different.

If you have been charged with assault and assault, call S&R Attorneys at 703.273.6431 for a FREE consultation. Benjamin Schaefer and Ryan Rambudhan are experienced Fairfax and Prince William County attorneys who focus on these types of crimes. Don’t be a victim; fight back!

Virginia law is quite complex when it comes to assault and personal injury. First some basic definitions.

Battery is basically any offensive or harmful contact. The nature of the contact doesn’t have to be very serious, it just has to be offensive. Simply throwing a snowball at another person could be considered battery in some cases, and if so, it’s a criminal act! However, there are some additional factors that must be present. In order to be guilty of assault, a person must intentionally make contact with the “victim” and intend what they are doing to cause harm or offense. So consider the following hypothesis: A man kisses the cheek of a woman sitting next to him on the subway. Battery? If he doesn’t know it, it’s probably a criminal battery, because almost anyone would find that offensive and he certainly wanted to do it. However, if the woman sitting next to him was his girlfriend, it probably wouldn’t be a battery because most sane people wouldn’t find that offensive. If the man accidentally fell into her because the train suddenly jerked, he had no intention of touching her, so there’s no battery.

Personal injury in the legal sense is very different from what most people think of when they hear the word personal injury. Most people think attack and battery are the same thing, or at least pretty similar. Actually that is not the case. The legal definition of bodily harm is “a willful act by a person which creates in another a fear of imminent harmful or abusive contact”. So basically, an attack means that another person thinks that you are going to touch or hurt them in an abusive way.

Common sense tells us that almost every time there is an assault there is an assault going on, which explains why the offenses are often grouped together as “assault and assault” when actually they are two different things.

Basic Attack and Battery

The basic version of assault and assault is covered by Virginia Code Section 18.2-57, which states that a person who commits simple assault or assault and assault is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for this offense is one year in prison and $2,500.

Attack and Battery – Based on religion or ethnicity

Virginia, like many states, has several so-called “hate crime” laws that make it a more serious crime to attack someone because of their race, religion, or ethnicity.

At 18.2-57(A) there is a minimum sentence of six months for a person to commit assault and assault against someone specifically selected on the basis of that person’s race, religious belief, color or national origin. The maximum is still a year in prison and $2,500. Additionally, under Virginia Code Section 18.2-57(B), if the victim does in fact suffer physical injury as a result of the assault and assault, the victim is guilty of a Class 6 felony punishable by up to five years in prison.

Assault and battery by police officers and other government employees

A commonly charged crime in Virginia is assault and assault on a police officer. Since a battery is basically any unwanted touch, any time a person resists arrest, it’s possible they also committed an assault and battery against the officer. Virginia law makes this a very serious offense.

Under 18.2-57(C), any assault or assault on a police officer while on official duty is a Class 6 felony punishable by up to five years in prison. Even more serious is that the minimum penalty for this offense is six months. This law also applies to other public servants such as firefighters, rescue workers, law enforcement officials and judges.

Attack and battery of teachers

Virginia law gives teachers special protections. Under 18.2-57(D), any person who assaulted a teacher, principal, assistant principal, or careers counselor, even if there was no injury, faces a prison sentence of between 15 days and one year. If the assault and assault involved a weapon that is prohibited on school property, the minimum sentence is six months.

Assault and Battery by Health Care Workers

Virginia law gives doctors and nurses special protections, as do teachers and police officers. Under 18.2-57(E), a person charged with battery of a health worker faces a minimum of 15 days and up to a year in prison. However, this protection only applies while at work, so a nurse’s battery while at home is the same as any other person’s.

Attack and battery of a family member

One of the most commonly prosecuted felonies in Virginia is assault and assault on a family member (also known as domestic assault and assault) under Section 18.2-57.2 of the Virginia Code. Law enforcement is often called to help deal with domestic situations. Sometimes these domestic situations have become physical. Since the standard for a criminal battery is basically any unwanted touch, almost every living person has committed the crime in one form or another. Realistically, however, law enforcement will usually only charge someone with assault and assault if there is an injury of some kind.

While this offense is somewhat identical to any other assault and assault, 18.2-57.2 lists some additional penalties that may apply. If someone has already been convicted of two similar charges in the past 20 years, that offense is a Class 6 felony, punishable by up to 5 years in prison. In these cases, too, an emergency protection order is issued, prohibiting the accused of domestic assault and assault from any contact with the victim for three days. Along with an arrest and criminal complaint, the person charged with assaulting and assaulting a family member is typically unable to return home for a few days.

The good news for someone charged with domestic assault and assault is that numerous defenses apply. In addition to the numerous elements of the offense that must be proven, self-defense is always a good defense against assault and assault. The law also carefully defines what a family member is, so a girlfriend or distant relative may not be considered a family member under the law. Finally, the law specifically allows for first-offender programs, in which a person is required to undergo some level of anger management or other training, but if successful, drops the charges.

If you have been charged with assault and assault, whether against a civilian complainant or a family member, call the S&R Attorney Office at 703.273.6431 for a FREE consultation. Benjamin Schaefer and Ryan Rambudhan are experienced Fairfax and Prince William County attorneys who focus on these types of crimes. Don’t be a victim; fight back!

VIRGINIA ATTACK & BATTERY ACT & PENALTIES

What is personal injury law in Virginia? Virginia consolidates both assault and personal injury into a single common law. “Assault and battery” or “simple assault” is a Class 1 misdemeanor charge under VA Act 18.2-57. Both assault and assault carry a maximum sentence of 1 year in prison, a maximum fine of $2,500.00 and full restitution to the victim.

First offenders and battery charges in Virginia generally do not carry the maximum penalties unless the conduct was egregious. Nonetheless, individuals charged with a first offense continue to face criminal convictions, detention, fines and redress.

In addition, personal injury and battery charges sometimes result in civil lawsuits after a personal injury and battery case is settled in criminal court.

WHAT IS ATTACK?

Assault and assault are not the same, although Virginia law groups and punishes both assault and assault under the same section of code.

Assault is defined as a threat with the means to perform a battery that causes the victim to have a reasonable fear of a battery or a reasonable apprehension of offensive contact, harm, or danger. The victim has to fear that the damage is imminent – that is, it will come immediately and not some time later. This is usually calculated as a basic attack.

For example, telephone threats would not constitute assault under the Personal Injury Act (although telephone threats are punishable as a separate crime in Virginia, as will be explained later) because the threat over a telephone is not imminent.

WHAT IS BATTERY?

Virginia courts define battery as simply touching another, intentionally or out of anger; this includes rude or abusive touches. This includes touching objects set in motion by the defendant, such as whips and even a defendant’s dogs.

Battery differs from attack in that battery requires physical contact, but attack does not require actual touch. Accidental, non-reckless touching is not considered battery, and an “accident” is a defense against that charge. Additional defenses include consenting to be touched (such as consenting to participate in a boxing match) and self-defense. A victim’s words, no matter how offensive, will not excuse a battery without first touching them. However, the victim’s conduct, including provocation and abusive language, is acceptable for mitigation.

Police officers sometimes incorrectly refer to Battery as Simple Assault when drafting paperwork. Although the designation may be incorrect, the charges of assault and battery are both codified and prohibited in the same section of code and are punished in the same way.

Criminal Attorney Advice This article was written by award-winning Virginia criminal defense attorney Marina Medvin, who defends assault, assault, assault, and malicious bodily harm charges in Arlington, Fairfax, Alexandria, Vienna, and Falls Church. Please email us by clicking below or call us at (888) 886-4127 to find out if you qualify for a free confidential consultation with an attorney. Click to call. Click to send an email

Penalty Table for Virginia Assault Charges

Offense Description Section Criminal Rating Maximum Penalty Minimum Penalty Maximum Penalty Simple Assault Va. Code 18.2-57 Class 1 Misdemeanor 12 Months N/A $2,500 Fine Assault & Battery Va. Code 18.2-57 Class 1 Mistake 12 Months N/A $2,500 Fine Assault on a family member Va. code 18.2-57.2 Class 1 offense 12 months N/A $2,500 fine Assault on law enforcement Va. code 18.2-57 Class 6 crime 5 years 6 months $2,500 fine Assault as hate crime Va. code 18.2-57 Class 1 offense 12 Months 6 months $2,500 fine Assault as a hate crime with injury Va. code 18.2-57 Class 6 felonies 5 years 6 months $2,500 fine Unlawful wounding Va. code 18.2-51 Class 6 felonies 5 years 1 year $2,500 fine Malicious wounding Va code 18.2 -51 Class 3 felonies 20 years 5 years $100,000 fine Strangulation Va. Code 18.2-51.6 Class 6 felonies 5 years 5 years $2,500 fine

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Assault as a hate crime

Virginia law makes battery, if it results in bodily harm, a Class 6 felony when a victim is intentionally assaulted because of race, religious belief, sex, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, color of skin or color national origin is selected. The penalty for conviction of this hate crime is a minimum sentence of at least 6 months and a maximum of 5 years in prison.

Simple assault or assault and assault when a victim is intentionally selected on the basis of race, religious belief, sex, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, color or national origin remains a Class 1 misdemeanor but requires a minimum sentence of six months, with a maximum of 12 months in prison for the offense of hate crimes.

Virginia’s Assault & Battery Law

§ 18.2-57. attack and battery; Penalty. § 18.2-57

A. Any person who commits simple assault or assault and assault is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor and if the person intentionally misrepresents the person being assaulted because of race, religious belief, sex, disability or gender identity, sexual orientation, skin color or national origin, the penalty, if convicted, is imprisonment for a minimum of six months.B. However, when a person intentionally selects the person to be assaulted and physically harmed followed by physical harm on the basis of race, religious belief, gender, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, color or national origin the person is guilty of a Class 6 felony, and the penalty upon conviction is a minimum of six months imprisonment.C. In addition, if a person commits an assault or an assault and assault against another person who knows or has reason to believe that that other person is a judge, a magistrate, a correctional officer as defined in Subpart F, a correctional officer as defined in Section 53.1 -1, an individual directly involved in the care, treatment, or supervision of inmates in the custody of the correctional facility, or an employee of a local or regional correctional facility directly involved in the care, treatment, or supervision of inmates in the custody of the facility , a person directly involved in the care, treatment, or supervision of anyone in the care or supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice, a staff member, or any other person providing control, care, or sexual treatment to violent individuals Predators in the care of the Department of Behavioral He alth and Developmental Services, a firefighter as defined in Section 65.2-102, or a volunteer firefighter, or an emergency medical technician l Service personnel who are employed or volunteer by an emergency services agency, or who are members of a bona fide volunteer fire or rescue agency , whether or not there is an order of organ of a branch recognizing as employees such firefighters or rescue workers employed anywhere in the Commonwealth in the performance of their public duties, that person has been found guilty of a Class 6 felony, and upon his conviction the judgment against that person must include a compulsory sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment. Nothing in this Subsection shall be construed to prejudice the right of any person charged with a violation of this Section to plead and present evidence in support of defenses against the charges that might be available under common law. D. In addition, when a person commits bodily harm against another person who knows or has reason to believe that such other person is a full-time or part-time employee of a public or private elementary or secondary school and is involved in the performance of their job is duties as such, he is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor and the conviction of such a person, if convicted, carries a sentence of 15 days imprisonment, of which two days is a compulsory minimum period of imprisonment. However, if the offense is committed through the use of a firearm or other weapon prohibited on school property under Section 18.2-308.1, the individual must serve a mandatory minimum sentence of six months. E. In addition, any person who commits battery against another person who knows or has reason to believe that such person is a healthcare provider, as defined in Section 8.01-581.1, who is engaged in the performance of his or her duties in a hospital or in an emergency room on the premises of a clinic or other facility providing emergency medical care is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The conviction of such a person carries a sentence of 15 days imprisonment if convicted, of which two days is a compulsory minimum period of imprisonment. F. As used in this Section: “Disability” means a physical or mental impairment that significantly limits one or more of a person’s principal activities in life. “Hospital” means a public or private establishment licensed under Chapter 5 (§32.1-123 et seq.) of Title 32.1 or Article 2 (§37.2-403 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 37.2. “Judge” means any judge or judge of a Court of Record of the Commonwealth, including a judge appointed under § 17.1-105, a judge on temporary recall under § 17.1-106 or a judge pro tempore under § 17.1-109, any Member of the State Corporation Commission or the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission and any judge of a district court of the Commonwealth or an alternate judge of such district court. “Law Enforcement Officer” means any full-time or part-time employee of a police department or sheriff’s office, part of or administered by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, who is responsible for the prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal, Commonwealth Traffic or Roads Acts, any Conservation Officer of the Department of Conservation and Recreation appointed pursuant to Section 10.1-115, any Special Representative of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority, Conservation Constables appointed pursuant to Section 29.1-. 200, sworn full-time members of the enforcement department of the Road Traffic Office appointed pursuant to Section 46, paragraphs 2 to 217, and all staff with internal investigative authorities appointed by the Correctional Authority pursuant to subsection 11 of Section 53, paragraphs 1 to 10, and the like To the Officers also include prison officers in local and regional correctional facilities, all deputy sheriffs, whether assigned to the law enforcement agency ies, court services, or local prison jurisdictions, auxiliary police officers appointed or designated under sections 15.2-1731 and 15.2-1733, under section 15.2-1603 appointed deputy deputy sheriffs, police officers of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority pursuant to Sections 5.1-158, and fire officers appointed pursuant to Sections 27-30 if such fire officers have law enforcement authority pursuant to Sections 27-34.2 and 27-34.2:1. “School Safety Officer” means the same as that term is defined in §9.1-101. G. “Simple assault” or “assault and assault” shall not be construed to include the use of school security officers or full-time or part-time employees of a public or private primary or secondary school while attending the course and scope of his official capacity: (i ) incidental, minor or reasonable physical contact or other acts to maintain order and control; (ii) reasonable and necessary force to quell a disturbance or to remove a student from the scene of a disturbance that threatens personal injury or property damage; (iii) reasonable and necessary force to prevent a student from harming himself or herself; (iv) reasonable and necessary force in self-defence or in defense of others; or (v) using reasonable and necessary force to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects or controlled substances or related paraphernalia on or under the student’s body. In determining whether an individual acted within the exceptions provided in this subsection, due consideration shall be given to the reasonable judgment of a school security officer or full-time or part-time employee of a public or private elementary or secondary school at the time of the event.

Domestic assault, charged under Va Code 18.2-57.2, is generally charged in Virginia when a family member or household member injures or bumps another family or household member. While the legal definitions of assault and assault are broader, charges are generally only pursued by police when there is actual injury, marking, or significant emotional impact on the victim.

Individuals accused or harassed for this offense may be a husband, wife, mother, father, cousin, sister, brother, parent, grandparent-child, girlfriend, boyfriend, roommate, etc . be.

Examples of battery behaviors include: shoving, hitting, hitting, slapping, hitting, hitting, hitting, hitting, throwing, etc. Threatening these acts can also be charged as assault if the attacking person puts their victim in a reasonable fear of imminent harm – which means that the accused must be recognizably immediately able to carry out the threat. Threats over the phone would not be counted as physical harm.

Virginia courts define battery as simply touching another, whether intentionally or out of anger; this includes touches that are rude or offensive. This includes touching objects set in motion by the defendant, such as whips and even a defendant’s dogs! It differs from attack in that a basic attack does not require actual touch. Accidental, non-reckless touching is not considered battery, and an “accident” is a defense against that charge. Additional defenses include: consenting to be touched (e.g. consenting to participate in a boxing match) and self-defense. A victim’s words, no matter how offensive, will not excuse a battery without first touching them. However, the victim’s conduct, including provocation and abusive language, is acceptable for mitigation.

CHILD CLOSING AS DOMESTIC ABUSING

The Virginia Court of Appeals has described this problem as follows: While parents can impose the appropriate and timely punishment needed to correct mistakes in an adolescent child, this right cannot be used as a cloak for the exercise of “uncontrolled passion.” A parent who is left unchecked during the use of corporal punishment may be criminally liable for assault and assault if the father’s mother administers corporal punishment that exceeds the limits of “reasonable moderation.” The court examines whether the punishment was moderate or excessive by analyzing the following factors: the circumstances of the punishment, the child’s age, size and behavior, the nature of the misconduct, the type of instrument used for punishment, and the type of markings or Wounds inflicted on the child’s body. In the Virginia Supreme Court’s most famous curling, the court simply stated that “the undisputed evidence of the wounds and bruises on this child’s body showed that he had been cruelly and brutally beaten.”

Examples of cases where criminal liability for excessive parental discipline has been established by the court:

– Beating a five-year-old child caused severely bruised buttocks with bleeding and purple spots and welts on both legs, causing the outer layer of skin to stick to the child’s underpants

– Beating a seven-year-old child resulted in open and bleeding bruises all over the body and a large bleeding cut on the face

– Child hit in head with phone causing bleeding

– A 10-year-old child hit his face once or twice with his closed hand, causing a laceration in the corner of the boy’s right eye, another in the area of ​​his nose and a scratch on his right shin

– A three-year-old child was beaten fifteen times with a belt, resulting in extensive bruising that required hospitalization

– Child tied to the floor of a bus and beaten on the head and body, resulting in death

Read more about domestic violence here: Virginia Domestic Assault Laws & Penalties: Defense Attorney’s Explanation of Va Code 18.2-57.2 Assault and Battery Against a Family or Household Member

Attacking with a weapon is also a Class 1 offense, but this type of attack is covered in more detail in the Virginia Gun, Firearm, and Weapon Law Revealed and Explained article.

ATTACKING A POLICE OFFICER / LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER / FIREFIGHTER

In the performance of their official duties, attacks on law enforcement officials are charged for punitive purposes. So those same assault and battery elements lead to a Class 6 felony conviction – with a mandatory minimum sentence of 6 months. Doing so is punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a fine of up to $2,500. Assault/battery on a probation officer is a Class 5 felony with up to 10 years in prison. Disarming the cop is a class 1 felony, but if the weapon you took was a stun gun/taser or a gun, then it’s a class 6 felony.

CRIME MAJOR INFRINGEMENT AND CRIME UNLAWFUL INFRINGEMENT

The Maiming Statute – Virginia Code § 18.2-51 – states: When a person maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts, or wounds or inflicts bodily harm in any way on a person with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or injure them kill, unless otherwise specified, he is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” This crime carries a penalty of up to 20 years in prison, a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years, and a fine of up to $100,000. If such an act is done unlawfully, but not maliciously, with the intent above, the offender is guilty of a Class 6 felony. Doing so is punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a fine of up to $2,500.

Malicious bodily harm must be proven by the government as follows:

1) intent to maliciously wound, injure, cut, stab, shoot, maim, disfigure, disable, or kill anyone, and

2) committed a direct but ineffective act to that end. The accused can inflict these injuries with hands and knees as well as with a knife, machete or sharp jewelry.

“Any means” in this section includes using your dog or pit bull to inflict the injuries. Maliciousness is broadly defined as the bad will to do something, or an intentional and unlawful act without legal justification. A wound is defined in Virginia as an injury to the skin. (If you see blood in a fight, the skin has been injured.) Injury in Virginia is defined as internal or organ damage. Serious injury or disfigurement is not necessary. In order to have the required intent under this law, the accused must have intended to inflict a permanent wound. It is not required that the wound is actually permanent or even serious, only that the accused intended such damage to be caused.

If the wound was indeed permanent, disfiguring, or severe, the defendant would be charged under Virginia Code Section 18.2-51.2, the aggravated malicious wounds statute. Serious malicious wounding is a Class 2 felony punishable by up to life imprisonment and has a minimum sentence of 20 years with a fine of up to $100,000. (This is the same punishment as a murder charge!)

Intent can be inferred from actions or words used by the defendant during and before the fight. But intent can also be inferred from the last act if the intentional act could reasonably result in an injury. The law assumes that the natural and necessary consequences of an act were intended by the accused when he committed the act. Of course, using guns or a dog easily triggers the derived intent as described above. However, using fists is a different story. Beating a person with his fists can only indicate intent for any of the outcomes described in the law if the beating is so violent or brutal that it can be reasonably inferred that the accused had such intent. Even if the beatings do not cause disfigurement, this law would apply to violating crimes if they were carried out with excessive force or brutality. An example of a case where the defendant was convicted of malicious injury for hitting someone was Clark v Commonwealth, where the defendant continued to hit the victim after she was down and had to be dragged away by others before she could was stopped. The courts look at the severity of the beating and the number of beatings. Unlawful wounding lacks the malice required of malicious wounding and therefore serves as a lesser contained violation of this law.

Assault and assault, the offense charged with hitting a person, is also a minor offense in this section of code. While the Mutilation Act specifically penalizes wounding as a crime, the Battery Act penalizes the offense of hitting/touching.

CRIME STRANGULATION

Strangulation is defined as obstructing the flow or breathing of another person by knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully applying pressure to such person’s neck – resulting in injury or bodily harm to that person.

Virginia hate crime crime

If the victim was intentionally selected on the basis of race, religion, color or ethnicity, there is a mandatory imprisonment of 6 months, of which the first 30 days is a mandatory minimum. Mentioning racial slurs before an unprovoked attack is enough to prove intentional selection based on hatred. If the victim was selected on the basis of race, religion, color, or ethnicity and the assault/battery results in bodily harm, Virginia law elevates the offense to a Class 6 felony with the same mandatory minimum penalties.

VA Law Threats

ASSAULTS AND THREATS during a robbery

There is a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for anyone who assaults, assaults, or threatens a victim while committing a robbery. The act is also charged as a felony. Va Code 18.2-58 states: “When a person commits a robbery by partial strangulation or suffocation, or by hitting or hitting, or by other violence against the person, or by causing bodily harm or otherwise causing a person to fear serious bodily harm, or by the threat or display of a firearm or other deadly weapon or instrument, he commits a felony and is punishable by life imprisonment or any five-year minimum sentence in a state correctional facility.

THREAT VIA A PHONE

Virginia has a law punishing threats made via phone calls. VA Code 18.2-427 penalizes the use of profane, threatening, or obscene language through public airways or other methods. “Any person who uses obscene, vulgar, profane, indecent, lascivious or indecent language or makes a suggestion or suggestion of an obscene nature or threatens any illegal or immoral act with intent to coerce, intimidate or harass any person, over any telephone or civic band radio in this Commonwealth is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.” Threats are punished the same as ordinary assault and assault – up to 1 year in prison.

Threats in writing or by email

A threat in writing or by email is a Class 6 felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison if you threaten a person or a member of their family with death or injury AND your threat to that person causes you to have reasonable fears of the Death or injury to himself or his family member. This is the same fear defined in personal injury law, but lacks the immediacy requirement in personal injury law. (VA code 18.2-60). In addition, bodily harm, with its higher legal requirements, is actually punished with a lower penalty. Therefore, a written threat is a much more serious offense than a personal threat.

Virginia Assault & Battery Law Overview: Jump to-

A battery, as defined in Penal Code 242, is any intentional and unlawful use of force or violence against the person of another.

Below are 5 things you should know about California battery laws.

How does the prosecutor prove battery under penal code 242?

In order to prove that the accused is guilty of assault under Section 242 of the Criminal Code, prosecutors must prove the following facts or elements:

The defendant intentionally and unlawfully.

. Violence or violence used or touched in a harmful or offensive manner.

. Someone else’s person.

The touch does not have to cause any pain or injury. Touching can be done indirectly by getting an object or another person to touch the other person.

example

Justin was at a rock concert when another guest threw a beer bottle in the air and hit Justin in the head. The patron later claimed he didn’t do it on purpose as he was drunk and didn’t know what he was doing.

In this situation, the patron of the battery is guilty. The nature of Justin’s injury determines whether the patron committed minor or grievous bodily harm.

If Justin sustained no injury or his injury was not serious, the court may find that it was a simple battery under Penal Code 242. On the other hand, if Justin suffered a serious head injury, the user will be charged with battery causing grievous bodily harm under penal code 243(d).

Furthermore, it doesn’t matter that the patron was intoxicated, because “voluntary intoxication” is not a defense against battery. Therefore, throwing the bottle in the air satisfies the “premeditated act” requirement for a battery conviction even though the user was intoxicated.

Distinction between attack and battery

Many people consider “assault” and “battery” to be the same offense, but they are two different crimes.

An “assault” is essentially an attempt to hurt another person.

While “battery” is the unlawful use of force or force against another person.

The main difference is that an attack doesn’t require physical contact or injury, while a battery requires some kind of physical contact, no matter how slight.

attack

The distinction can be made clearer using the following example: A man with a lot of hustle and bustle on the street is provoked by the fact that a woman is driving ahead of him in the lane when he enters the freeway.

So angry that he is determined to crash his car into hers, he accelerates and adopts a menacing driving style, driving ever closer to her car as if he were about to hit her car. The woman is very afraid of being hit by the man’s car, so she keeps swerving to the right to avoid colliding with his car.

Although the man’s car never collided with the woman’s car, the man can be charged with assault under California Penal Code 240 for intentionally and violently attempting to collide with the woman’s car on the freeway, and he has the gift Ability to carry out the threat.

battery

If the man’s car does indeed manage to collide with the woman’s car, the man could be charged with both assault and battery. However, since assault is a lesser contained offense of assault, he can only be convicted of one or the other.

Legal defense against battery charges

There are several defenses that can be invoked on your behalf to combat a battery charge. Here are the most common:

self defense

If the defendant acted in self-defense or in defense of others, he cannot be convicted of assault. In order to assert this defense, the accused must have a reasonable belief that physical harm is likely to occur to himself or another person and must have the right to use force that is proportionate to the force threatened to repel the attack.

Example: Ken was at a car wash when another customer attacked him. Ken didn’t recognize the man, but when he saw the man preparing to punch him in the face, Ken reacted quickly by punching him first. Because Ken acted in self-defense and used force reasonable to repel the attacker, he will not be charged with assault.

accident

This defense applies in a situation where the accused is not intentionally causing violence or injury to another person.

Examples include:

car accident

Accidentally dropping an item from one balcony that hits another

An accidental bicycle accident

Accidentally tripping or pushing someone on a crowded bus or down a crowded street

approval

Consent is typically a defense against battery when an individual engages in an activity where the risk of battery is widespread. This usually applies to sports games or other inherently dangerous activities.

Not considered a viable defense

Voluntary intoxication – is no protection against battery:

In California, a defendant who commits an assault while intoxicated cannot use voluntary intoxication as a defense. The rationale behind the law is that criminals know (or should know) that alcohol and drugs impair mental functioning and hold them legally responsible if they commit crimes as a result of their voluntary use.

However, if an accused can show that he/she was involuntarily intoxicated, the accused of battery will not be found guilty because he/she did not choose to use the intoxicating substance.

Provocation – is not a defense against battery:

It is not a defense for a battery crime that the defendant responded to a provocative act that was not a threat or an attempt to cause bodily harm. Words alone, no matter how offensive or annoying, are no excuse for this crime.

Consequences of a battery conviction

Any conviction for battery can result in severe penalties, possibly including imprisonment. If you are facing a battery charge under California Penal Code 242, you may be facing the following penalties.

Penalty Misdemeanors Fine $2,000 max. Anger management classes Negotiable firearms ban 10 years county jail, no more than 6 months ((Id)

related crimes

Personal injury against an elderly or dependent adult: When personal injury is committed against an elderly or dependent adult, as defined in Section 368 pc of the Criminal Code, with knowledge that the victim is an elderly or dependent adult, special penalties apply. (Penal Code 243.25.)

Assault with a deadly weapon: California Penal Code 245(a)(1) pc provides that anyone who commits an assault on another person with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for two , three or four years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars $10,000, or both the fine and imprisonment.

Domestic Battery: California Domestic Battery Laws Penal Code 243(e)(1) pc applies when a battery is committed against any of the following: spouse, a person with whom the defendant lives, a person whose parent is of the defendant’s child, ex-spouse, fiancé, or any person with whom the defendant is or had a current relationship or an engaged relationship, the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment in a county jail a Period not exceeding one year or both this fine and imprisonment. See also Criminal Code Domestic Violence 273.5 pcs

Sexual Violence – California Penal Code 243.4 pc provides the “sexual violence” statute, which includes non-consensual touching of another’s privates for: (1) sexual arousal, (2) sexual gratification, or (3) sexual abuse.

Posted on July 25, 2022

Attack vs. Battery – “What’s the difference?”

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Assault and assault are related but different crimes. An assault occurs when an individual commits an act that gives a victim a reasonable fear of harmful or abusive contact. Battery, on the other hand, is when someone commits an act that actually causes harmful or offensive contact to the victim.

Both assault and battery are typically charged as a misdemeanor (as opposed to a misdemeanor or felony). The crimes are punished with imprisonment and heavy fines.

Note that a person accused of any of these crimes can fight the case by asserting a legal defense. For example, a defendant may allege that he:

How is an attack different from a battery under US law?

Assault and assault are separate and distinct crimes. The main difference between the two offenses is that while an assault does not necessarily involve actual physical contact with another person, battery does.

An assault is when a person commits an act that can cause physical harm to another person.

A battery takes place when one person commits an act that causes physical harm to another.

An attack is like an attempted attack while an attack is like a completed attack.

What is the crime of simple assault?

An assault is usually defined as an act that gives the victim a reasonable fear of harmful or abusive contact.

While a battery involves the actual use of force or force, assault focuses specifically on attempting to use such force or force.

Note that in relation to the use of force or violence, any harmful or abusive touch is generally sufficient to establish a charge of assault. The slightest touch counts if it’s done in a rude or offensive way.

Accusations of physical harm can be made even if the related touch did not and could not cause any form of physical harm. Also, the actual touch doesn’t have to be direct. This can be done indirectly by an object touching the “victim”.

Bodily harm is usually charged as a misdemeanor. The crime is often punished with:

imprisonment in prison (as opposed to state prison) of up to six months and/or

a maximum fine of $1,000.

Some states have varying degrees of attacks, such as B. First, second and even third degree attacks.

Note that grievous bodily harm is a more violent crime than simple bodily harm. Examples of this form of assault include:

What is the crime of the simple battery?

Battery is defined as any intentional and unlawful use of force or force on another person. The legal definition of battery requires that a person actually inflict harmful or abusive contact on the victim. It is not necessary that the person caused bodily harm to the alleged “victim”. In fact, the slightest touch can be a battery.

A battery also occurs when the touch occurs:

through the clothing of the victim and/or

indirectly through an object with which the accused touches the “victim”.

Unlike assault, battery charges must include claims that actual contact occurred. For example, there can be no criminal charge of battery if one person pushes another person and misses. A charge of assault could still be brought.

Simple batteries are usually charged as an administrative offence. States typically punish offenders with:

up to six months imprisonment and/or

significant fines.

Note that a heavy battery is heavier than a plain battery. An aggravated battery is a battery that inflicts grievous bodily harm or grievous bodily harm on the ‘victim’.

Can a defendant raise a legal defense when charged with assault or bodily harm?

A defendant may raise a legal defense to contest an assault or battery charge.

An effective defense can help mitigate or even dismiss a criminal charge. Note, however, that it is best to have an experienced criminal defense attorney raise a defense on behalf of a defendant.

Our law firm’s criminal defense attorneys advise clients that there are four effective defenses to assault charges. The defendant’s statements are as follows:

did not attempt to use force, acted in self-defense, did not act intentionally and was wrongly accused.

In terms of battery, there are four effective defenses a defendant can raise. The defendant’s statements are as follows:

did not actually touch another person (in fact, was only trying to), acted intentionally, acted in self-defense, and was stopped or charged without good reason.

What is the law in California?

Under California law, in order to successfully convict a defendant of minor assault, a prosecutor must prove the following:

the accused committed an act which, by its nature, would directly and likely lead to the use of violence against a person, the accused committed that act intentionally when the accused acted had facts known to him which a reasonable person would recognize his/her action would, by its nature, lead directly and likely to the use of force against someone, and if the defendant acted, he/she had the current ability to use force against a person.

Under California law, in order to convict a person of minor assault, a prosecutor must prove the following:

The Defendant intentionally and unlawfully touched anyone in a harmful or offensive manner, and the Defendant did not act in self-defense or in defense of another person.

Legal Notice:

Criminal offense in which the unlawful physical action occurs in response to a threat

This article is about the crime. For the prohibited aspects of the battery, see Battery (crimes) . For other uses of the word “battery” see battery

Battery is a criminal offense involving unlawful physical contact, and is distinct from assault, which involves creating a fear of such contact.

Battery is a specific common law offense, although the term is used more broadly to refer to any unlawful abusive physical contact with another person. Battery is defined in American common law as “any unlawful and/or unwanted contact with the person of another by the attacker or by any substance set in motion by the attacker”.[1] In more severe cases, and for all types in some jurisdictions, it is primarily defined by statutory wording. The rating of a battery’s severity is determined by local laws.

General [edit]

Specific regulations related to batteries vary by jurisdiction, but some elements remain the same in all jurisdictions. Battery generally requires the following:

an offensive touch or contact is made with the victim, instigated by the actor; and the actor intends or knows that his action will cause the offensive touch.

Under the US Model Penal Code and in some jurisdictions, assault is when the actor acts recklessly without the specific intent of causing offensive contact. Battery is usually classified as either easy or difficult. Although rechargeable batteries typically appear in the context of physical altercations, they can also arise in other circumstances, such as medical cases where a doctor is performing an unauthorized medical procedure.

Specific countries[ edit ]

Canada[ edit ]

Batteries are not defined in the Canadian Criminal Code. Instead, the code provides a criminal offense of assault and assault.

England and Wales[edit]

Battery is a common law offense in England and Wales.

As with most offenses in the UK, it has two elements:

Actus reus: The accused unlawfully touched the victim or used force

Mens rea: The defendant intended or was reckless in relation to the unlawful touch or use of force

This offense is a crime against autonomy, with more violent crimes such as ABH and GBH being statutory offenses under the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861.

Even the slightest touch can amount to an illegal use of force.[2] However, it is assumed that everyday encounters (e.g. making contact on public transport) are permitted and not punishable.[3]

Much confusion can arise between the terms “attack” and “battery”. In everyday usage, the term assault can be used to describe a physical attack that is actually a battery. An attack causes someone to fear that they may become a victim of a battery. This problem is so pervasive that the crime of sexual assault [4] is better termed sexual battery. This confusion stems from the fact that both attack and battery can be called ordinary attack. In practice, the wording used to charge such an offense is “bluffing by beating”, which, however, has the same meaning as “battery”.

There is no separate offense for a domestic violence battery; However, the introduction of the offense of ‘controlling or coercing conduct in an intimate or family relationship’ in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015[5] has resulted in new prosecution guidelines[6] which include significant aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, resulting in potentially longer imprisonment for domestic violence assault.

Whether it is a criminal offense[edit]

In DPP v. Taylor, DPP v. Little[7], assault was found to be an offense falling within Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.[8] This decision was criticized in Haystead v. DPP[9], in which the Divisional Court expressed the Obiter opinion that battery remains a common law offence.

While it is perhaps a better view that assault and assault have statutory penalties rather than being statutory offences, it is nevertheless the case that pending review by a higher court, DPP v. Little is the preferred authority.[10]

Negotiation and judgment mode[ edit ]

In England and Wales, assault is a summary offense under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. However, a charge may be brought under Section 40 where another offense based on the same facts or together with those forming part of a series of offenses is also charged is of a similar character. When it comes to prosecution, a Crown Court has no greater jurisdiction than a Magistrates’ Court.

It is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of six months or a fine not exceeding step 5 on the regulatory scale, or both.

Russia[ edit ]

There is an offense that could (loosely) be called a battery in Russia. Article 116[11] of the Russian Criminal Code provides that assault or similar violent acts that cause pain are criminal offenses.

Scotland[ edit ]

There is no clear battery offense in Scotland. The criminal offense of bodily harm includes acts that could be described as bodily harm.

United States[edit]

In the United States, criminal battery, or simple battery, is the use of violence against others that results in harmful or abusive contact, including sexual contact.[12] By common law, a simple battery is a misdemeanor. The prosecutor must prove all three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:[13]

an unlawful use of force on the person of another resulting in either physical harm or offensive touch.

The common law elements serve as a basic template, but individual jurisdictions may change them, and they may vary slightly from state to state.

Under modern legal systems, the battery is often divided into classes that determine the severity of the punishment. For example:

A simple battery can include any form of non-consensual harmful or abusive contact, regardless of the injury caused. Criminal Battery requires intent to cause injury to another.

may include some form of non-consensual harmful or abusive contact, regardless of the injury caused. A criminal battery requires inflicting injury on another. Sexual battery can be defined as non-consensual touching of another’s intimate parts. In Florida at least, “sexual battery means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object”: See Section 794.011. [14]

can be defined as non-consensual touching of another’s privates. In Florida at least, “sexual battery means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object”: See Section 794.011. The scope of domestic violence can be narrowed between people within a certain degree of relationship: legislation has been enacted to deal with the crime in response to increasing awareness of the problem of domestic violence.

may be restricted in its scope between individuals within a certain degree of relationship: legislation has been enacted to address the offense in response to increasing awareness of the problem of domestic violence. Aggravated assault is generally considered a major offense of criminal offenses. Aggravated battery charges can occur when a battery causes serious personal injury or permanent disfigurement. As a successor to the common law crime of chaos, this is sometimes subsumed under the definition of grievous bodily harm. In Florida, aggravated battery is the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm and a second-degree felony,[15] while battery inadvertently causing grievous bodily harm is considered a third-degree felony.[16]

Kansas [edit]

In the state of Kansas, battery is defined as follows:[17]

Battery. (a) Battery is: (1) knowingly or recklessly causing physical harm to another person; or (2) knowingly causing physical contact with another person when doing so in a rude, abusive, or angry manner.

Louisiana[ edit ]

The battery law in Louisiana reads:[18]

Section 33. Battery defines Battery is the willful use of force or force against the person of another; or the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.

Jurisdictional differences[edit]

In some jurisdictions, battery has recently been engineered to involve directing bodily waste (i.e. spitting) at another person without their permission. Some of these jurisdictions automatically charge such a battery to the burden of an aggravated battery. In some jurisdictions, criminal assault charges also require proof of a mental state (mens rea). The terminology used to refer to a specific offense may also vary by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions, such as New York, label what would be assault under common law as assault and then use a different term for the crime that would have been assault, such as assault. B. Threat.

Distinguishing between battery and battery

A typical overt behavior of an attack is Person A chasing Person B and swinging a fist at their head. The one for battery is a prominent B.

Battery required:

an act of will, that

leads to harmful or abusive contact with another person and

committed for the purpose of causing harmful or offensive contact, or in circumstances that make such contact substantially safe, or with reckless disregard for whether such contact will result.

Bodily harm, as rooted in English law, is attempted bodily harm or the act of willfully causing a person to fear harmful or abusive contact with himself. Elsewhere it is often worded similarly to the threat of violence against a person, while grievous bodily harm is the threat with the clear and existing ability and willingness to carry it out. Aggraved Battery is typically an offensive touch without a tool or weapon in an attempt to injure or restrain.

See also[edit]

Content Warning: This blog post covers violent and sex crimes, including those committed against children.

Domestic violence is a complex issue and sometimes it can take months or even years for the victim to pursue it in court. But when it comes to criminal charges, they don’t have unlimited time to do so.

A “statute of limitations” is a state law that sets a time limit for prosecuting a criminal offense. In principle, the public prosecutor’s office can no longer charge the accused with a crime if sufficient time has elapsed after the crime.

In Georgia there are a number of different crimes that may fall under the definition of “domestic violence” and the penalties for these crimes are usually higher than for similar crimes that do not involve a family. But how long do victims of domestic violence and the public prosecutor have until the statute of limitations expires?

The short answer: probably 2 or 4 years, unless the victim is a minor, in which case it’s 7 years. The long answer is a bit more complicated and depends on the crime committed. Our team of criminal defense attorneys explain below.

A person commits the offense of simple bodily harm when they either: attempt to violently harm the person of another; or commits any act which gives another a reasonable fear of immediate violent injury. Except as provided in subsections (c) through (h) of this section of the Code, a person who commits the offense of simple bodily harm is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who commits the offense of simple bodily harm in a public transport or train station will be punished for a misdemeanor of a serious and serious nature after being convicted. For purposes of this section of the Code, “public transit vehicle” means a bus, van, or rail car used for the transportation of people within a system that receives a subsidy from tax revenues or under a county or municipality franchise agreement is operated This state. If the offense of simple bodily harm is committed between former or current spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, parents and children, step-parents and step-children, foster parents and foster children or other persons other than siblings living or formerly living in the same household, the accused becomes the accused punished for an offense of a serious and serious nature. In no event does this subsection apply to corporal punishment inflicted on a child by a parent or guardian or by any person acting in loco parentis. Any person who commits the offense of minor assault against a person who is 65. Anyone who commits the offense of minor assault against an employee of a public school system in that state while that employee is on official duty or on school property will be charged if convicted such an offense for a misdemeanor punishable by high and severe penalty nature. For the purposes of this section of the Code, “school property” includes public school buses and public school bus stops designated by local school authorities. Anyone who commits the offense of simple bodily harm against a woman who is pregnant at the time of the offense will be punished after being convicted of a misdemeanor of a more serious and serious nature. Nothing in this section of the Code shall be construed as permitting the prosecution of: any person for abortion-related conduct for which the consent of the pregnant woman or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf is obtained has been or for which such consent has been given is required by law; Any person for the medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or Any woman in relation to her unborn child. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “unborn child” means a member of the species Homo sapiens at any stage of development that is carried in the womb.

(Acts 1833, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 787; Code 1863, §§ 4256, 4257; Code 1868, §§ 4291, 4292; Code 1873, §§ 4357, 4358; Code 1882, §§ 4357, 4358; Penal Code 1895 , Sections 95, 96; Criminal Code 1910, Sections 95, 96; Code 1933, Sections 26-1401, 26-1402; Code 1933, Sections 26-1301, issued by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249 , § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 971, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 2; Ga. L. 1999 , p. 562, § 2; 2004, p. 621, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 16/HB 95; Ga. L. 2006, p. 643, § 1/SB 77.)

– Pursuant to Section 28-9-5 of the Code, 1999 replaced “subsections (c), (d) and (e)” with “subsections (c) and (d)” in subsection (b) and subsection (d) as of Ga.L. 1999, p. 562, § 2, renamed subsection (e).

– Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This statute shall be known and referred to as the ‘Crimes Against Family Members Act 1999’.”

Ga.L. 1999, p. 381, § 7, which was not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Nothing herein shall be construed as confirming a relationship between persons of the same sex as ‘marriage’ under the laws of that State.”

Ga.L. 1999, p. 562, §1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and referred to as the ‘Crimes Against Elderly Persons Act 1999′.”

Ga. L. 2004, p. 621, § 9(b), not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by this Act applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2004.

Ga. L. 2006, p. 643, § 5, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by this law applies to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 2006.

– For reviews of criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For the article “Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia” see 7 Ga. St. B. J. 8 (2001). For articles amending this section of the Code in 2006, see 23 Georgia. St.U.L. Rev. 37 (2006). For the 1999 changes to the sections of the Code in this article, see 16 Georgia. St.U.L. Rev. 72 (1999).

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

application

Not excessive force

Jury statement

General Consideration

Competing jurisdiction with federal labor law.

– Even in situations falling within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq., the state retains concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the O.C.G.A. before. § 16-5-20 as it relates directly to preventing or inciting direct violence or preventing the threat of direct violence or violent injury. State v. Klinakis, 206 Ga. App. 318, 425 SE2d 665 (1992).

– The offense of simple bodily harm is complete when there is such a display of violence with an apparent capacity to inflict injury as to cause the person against whom it is directed to reasonably fear injury, unless the person pulls stand back to ensure the safety of that person. Hise v. State, 127 Ga. App. 511 , 194 SE2d 274 (1972); Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 SE2d 905 (1975).

A simple attack does not require physical contact with the victim. Tuggle vs. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 SE2d 131 (1978).

Any attempt to commit an unlawful act of violence that harms another was included in former Code 1933, § 26-1401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20). Williams v. State, 15 Ga. App. 306, 82 SE 938 (1914).

Assault is crude violence, with the current means of putting violence into action. Intending to inflict bodily harm is the essence of bodily harm. Mullen v. State, 51 Ga. App. 385, 180 SE 521 (1935).

– The state may produce a surviving aggravated assault victim for jury inspection if, although the victim does not testify, the victim’s presence establishes that the victim is a “person” to establish the elements of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a). perry v State, 276 Ga. 836, 585 S.E.2d 614, rev’d, 276 Ga. 839, 584 S.E.2d 253 (2003).

– If there was no evidence that the defendant committed an act that constituted a substantial step toward committing a battery, the defendant could not be convicted of assault because the evidence failed to satisfy the “commits an act” element . In the interest of C.S., 251 Ga. App. 411, 554 SE2d 558 (2001).

– Charge of aggravated assault under the O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 based on the provisions of the O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) requires a criminal intent fatally inconsistent with the negligence qualifying for a charge of reckless conduct under the O.C.G.A. is required. § 16-5-60(b). Reddick v. State, 264 Ga. App. 487, 591 S.E.2d 392 (2003), repealed on other grounds by State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (2015).

Aggravated assault convictions were upheld because the defendant approached officers who were standing in front of a roadblock, forced them to jump out of the way, and tripped one. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 371, 606 SE2d 594 (2004).

There must be intent to commit an illegal act. Woodruff vs. Woodruff, 22 Ga. 237 (1857); Dorsey v. State, 108 Ga. 477, 34 S.E. 135 (1899).

Intent is a question for the jury. Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 S.E. 748 (1896); Robinson v. State, 118 Ga. 750, 45 S.E. 620 (1903).

– There does not need to be actual ability to commit the violation. There need only be an apparent ability to inflict violence on the person being attacked. Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 S.E. 748 (1896).

Merely preparing to violently injure another person without physical exertion is not assault. Fennell v. State, 164 Ga. 59, 137 S.E. 762 (1927); Mullen v. State, 51 Ga. App. 385, 180 SE 521 (1935).

Contact out of rudeness is just as offensive and harmful as out of anger or lust, and legally constitutes assault and assault. Brown v. State, 57 Ga. App. 864, 197 SE 82 (1938).

– While the mere threat or threat to commit violent injury to the person of another is not sufficient to constitute bodily harm, however, the threat or threat is accompanied by an apparent attempt to commit such injury, and its accomplishment will also prevented by the action of the person who is threatened with the attack or by the intervention of a third party, the violence has begun and the attack has ended. Harrison v. State, 60 Ga. App. 610, 4 SE2d 602 (1939).

There need not be an actual present ability to inflict violent harm on the person being assaulted, but if there is such a demonstration of violence coupled with an apparent ability to inflict the injury to reasonably fear the injury to the person against whom it is directed, unless the person retreats to ensure that person’s safety, and in such circumstances the person is forced to retreat to avoid imminent danger, the attack is complete, although the attacker may never be within actual range of the person attacked was . Harrison v. State, 60 Ga. App. 610, 4 SE2d 602 (1939).

– It is lawful to convict of simple assault despite evidence showing that assault was committed because by definition assault is nothing more than attempted assault. Scott v. State, 141 Ga. App. 848, 234 SE2d 685 (1977).

Attack is inevitably included in every battery. Terry v. State, 166 Ga. App. 632 , 305 SE2d 170 (1983); Anderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 634, 317 SE2d 877 (1984).

– The offense of simple bodily harm is complete when there is a demonstration of violence combined with an apparent present capacity to inflict injury such that the person against whom it is directed has a reasonable fear that the person will suffer imminent violent injury , if the person does not withdraw to ensure the safety of that person. Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 432, 280 SE2d 856 (1981).

A significant step toward assault must be taken before an assault can occur, since assault is attempted assault. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 SE2d 238 (1980).

– Charge the defendant with grievous bodily harm by committing two counts, but the state only needs to prove one of the two counts that constitute the felony of grievous bodily harm to uphold the conviction. Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 529 S.E.2d 650 (2000), rescinded for other reasons, Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

Any attack must be intentional to injure. The test is, was there a current purpose of the battery? Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978) rescinded on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

The state of mind of a perpetrator or a victim, including whether a victim has a reasonable fear of injury or fear from an event, can be supported by indirect evidence or circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 12 , 430 S.E.2d 157 (1993).

When the language of the indictment did not reflect the precise language of the Assault Act, but claimed that the defendant “maliciously” struck the victim, it correctly asserted the necessary element of intent given the circumstances of the case in which the victim did so If one had not seen the defendant hitting the victim, it would have been difficult to conclude that the victim would have had reasonable fears that he had been violently injured. Gamble vs. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 510 SE2d 69 (1998).

– There is no need to demonstrate actual injury to establish assault, only intent to commit injury coupled with an apparent ability to do so. Reeves v. State, 128 Ga. App. 750, 197 SE2d 843 (1973).

There does not need to be an actual ability to inflict violence on the person being attacked; but, when there is such a display of force, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict the injury, to reasonably cause the person against whom it is directed to fear injury, unless the person backs down to to ensure the safety of that person, and in such circumstances the person is forced to retreat to avoid imminent danger, the attack is complete even though the attacker may never have been within actual range of the person attacked. Reeves v. State, 128 Ga. App. 750, 197 SE2d 843 (1973).

– Evidence that the victim had fears of immediate violent injury need not necessarily be based solely on the victim’s statement about the victim’s mental state, but may be inferred from the victim’s behavior, e.g. B. when the victim retreats to safety. Hurt vs. State, 158 Ga. App. 722, 282 SE2d 192 (1981).

– Simple bodily harm is defined as an act that gives rise to a reasonable fear that another will immediately commit violent injury under the O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), an attack is aggravated if committed with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); Thus, if the victim reasonably fears imminent violent injury from a weapon, then there is aggravated assault. Because a reasonable fear of injury is not the same as simple fear, stating that the victim was not afraid of the defendant does not preclude a conviction. Lunsford v. State, 260 Ga. App. 818, 581 SE2d 638 (2003).

The mere threat of violent injury to the person of another is not sufficient to constitute bodily harm. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739 , 218 SE2d 905 (1975); Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 432, 280 SE2d 856 (1981).

– In any criminal proceeding for grievous bodily harm, the trial judge must include a statement on elements of simple bodily harm in the definition of grievous bodily harm judge. Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 SE2d 28 (1981).

“Attack” in grievous assault is not the same as simple assault in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20. Zachery v. State, 158 Ga. App. 448, 280 SE2d 860 (1981).

– Because an indictment containing the indictment that the defendant “unlawfully and willfully caused the victim’s death by striking” advised the defendant of a possible conviction for either assaulting the victim with intent to murder or committing violent bodily harm, the Defendants convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser included crime of malicious murder; The only difference was that the malicious murder charge alleged that the defendant actually carried out the murder, in addition to having intent to commit the murder. Reagan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 708, 637 SE2d 113 (2006).

– The trial court does not necessarily err in failing to indict the definition of mere assault on the charge of grievous bodily harm, since a charge of mere assault need not be brought to complete the definition of grievous bodily harm. Willis v. State, 167 Ga. App. 626, 307 SE2d 133 (1983).

Defendant’s allegation that a charge of simple assault under the O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 must be included to define the O.C.G.A.’s grievous bodily harm definition. to complete. § 16-5-21, since the latter does not need the former to complete it. Spaulding v. State, 185 Ga. App. 812, 366 S.E.2d 174, Cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 366 SE2d 174 (1988).

– Simple assault under former Code 1933, §26-1301 (see O.C.G.A. §16-5-20) and pointing a gun or pistol at another person under former Code 1933, §26-2908 (see O.C.G.A. §16- 11-102). both misdemeanors and belong to the greater crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 SE2d 131 (1978).

Simple bodily harm is not a lesser terrorist threat offense. McQueen v. State, 184 Ga. App. 630, 362 SE2d 436 (1987).

Defendant could not show error in refusing to combine offenses because Defendant could not show that grievous bodily harm was proved by the same facts used to prove simple bodily harm; Evidence that the defendant entered a store wearing a mask, that the defendant opened the cash drawer, that the defendant attempted to extort a key to the drawer from the clerk’s hand, that the defendant demanded money, that the defendant on the register hammered and that the defendant appeared to have a weapon supported the aggravated assault conviction, but none of this evidence was needed to prove simple battery, which was substantiated by evidence of the defendant’s bloody blows to the clerk’s arm. Lawson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 334, 620 SE2d 600 (2005).

– Under Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, 1280 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20), numerous criminal offenses that were previously expressly listed are grouped as bodily harm or bodily harm. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 SE2d 407 (1972).

– When the circumstances clearly reveal a situation in which the jury could determine that the alleged victim, with a handgun pointed at the victim, had reasonable fears of immediate violent injury, the evidence clearly supports the simple assault conviction. Hise v. State, 127 Ga. App. 511, 194 SE2d 274 (1972).

Because the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault was based on the victim’s ability under the O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the guilty verdict did not eliminate the criminal negligence element of reckless conduct and therefore was not mutually exclusive with a guilty verdict of serious injury by a vehicle based on reckless driving. Dryden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 70, 728 SE2d 245 (2012).

– Convictions of theft, aggravated assault and terrorist threat were supported by evidence because the defendant admitted taking gas cans, raised a machete to scare or hit the sibling, the sibling was startled and ran away and the defendant then the sibling threatened that if either of them called the sheriff, the accused would return and kill them. Turner vs. State, 273 Ga. App. 535, 615 SE2d 603 (2005).

Aggravated assault and minor assault convictions against the defendant did not have to be reversed because police failed to save the defendant’s car after the defendant took part in an aggressive chase, leading to the assault charges that arose that the defendant had used his car as a weapon as there was no evidence that the police acted in bad faith in failing to secure the evidence and no evidence that the possible exculpatory value of the car preceded his destruction was evident. Ransby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 594, 615 SE2d 651 (2005).

Despite the recantation by a juvenile’s parent in court because there was sufficient evidence that the juvenile gave the parent a reasonable fear of being hit with a hammer, consistent with allegations in the parent’s complaint filed immediately after the incident, that ruled Juvenile court against the youth for grievous bodily harm was upheld on appeal. In the interest of C.B., 288 Ga. App. 752, 655 SE2d 342 (2007).

– When the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant’s request for leave to file a second or subsequent motion to vacate, vacate, or rectify the defendant’s federal judgment was denied because the defendant had three previous convictions of violent Criminal offenses had under the Elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924 because the defendant had two separate convictions in Georgia for criminal obstruction of a law enforcement officer and one conviction in Georgia for aggravated assault which, for ACCA purposes, constituted violent crimes. Regarding White, F.3d (11. Cir. 15 Jun 2016).

Quoted in Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. App. 542, 178 SE2d 42 (1970); Smith v. State, 127 Ga. App. 468 , 193 SE2d 921 (1972); Bentley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 425 , 205 SE2d 904 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41 , 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Hale v. State, 135 Ga. App. 625 , 218 SE2d 643 (1975); Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924 , 219 SE2d 636 (1975); ray v State, 235 Ga. 467, 219 S.E.2d 761 (1975); Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395 , 231 SE2d 143 (1976); Williams v. State, 141 Ga. App. 201, 233 SE2d 48 (1977); Leach v. State, 143 Ga. App. 598 , 239 SE2d 177 (1977); passport from State, 144 Ga. App. 253, 240 SE2d 777 (1977); Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 551 , 246 SE2d 734 (1978); Peterkin v. State, 147 Ga. App. 437 , 249 S.E.2d 152 (1978); Ruff v. State, 150 Ga. App. 238 , 257 S.E.2d 203 (1979); Jarrad v. State, 152 Ga. App. 553 , 263 SE2d 444 (1979); Sutton v. State, 245 Ga. 192, 264 S.E.2d 184 (1980); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801 , 266 SE2d 522 (1980); Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga. App. 835 , 270 SE2d 61 (1980); Webb v. State, 156 Ga. App. 623 , 275 SE2d 707 (1980); C.L.T. v. State, 157 Ga. App. 180 , 276 SE2d 862 (1981); Delano v. State, 158 Ga. App. 296 , 279 SE2d 743 (1981); Craft vs. State, 158 Ga. App. 745 , 282 SE2d 203 (1981); Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. 480, 284 S.E.2d 267 (1981); Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740 , 285 SE2d 213 (1981); goodman v Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982); Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886 , 293 S.E. 2d 474 (1982); Capitol TV Serv., Inc. v. Derrick, 163 Ga. App. 65 , 293 S.E. 2d 724 (1982); Joiner v. State, 163 Ga. App. 521 , 295 SE2d 219 (1982); Chastain v. State, 163 Ga. App. 678 , 296 S.E. 2d 69 (1982); Talley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 150 , 296 SE2d 173 (1982); Petouvis v. State, 165 Ga. App. 409 , 301 S.E.2d 483 (1983); McWilliams v. State, 172 Ga. App. 55 , 322 S.E. 2d 87 (1984); Lester v. State, 173 Ga. App. 300 , 325 SE2d 912 (1985); Hamby v. State, 173 Ga. App. 750 , 328 SE2d 224 (1985); Swint vs. State, 173 Ga. App. 762 , 328 S.E.2d 373 (1985); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444 , 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Green vs. State, 175 Ga. App. 92 , 332 S.E. 2d 385 (1985); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565 , 340 S.E.2d 843 (1986); King vs. State, 178 Ga. App. 343 , 343 S.E.2d 401 (1986); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 SE2d 55 (1987); Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987); Binns v. State, 258 Ga. 23, 364 S.E.2d 871 (1988); Munoz v. State, 190 Ga. App. 806 , 380 S.E. 2d 88 (1989); Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 905 , 392 SE2d 330 (1990); State vs. Seignious, 197 Ga. App. 766 , 399 SE2d 559 (1990); Knox v. State, 261 Ga. 272, 404 S.E.2d 269 (1991); Gaston v. State, 209 Ga. App. 477 , 433 S.E.2d 306 (1993); smiley v State, 263 Ga. 716, 438 S.E.2d 75 (1994); Powell v. State, 228 Ga. App. 56 , 491 SE2d 135 (1997); Reeves v. State, 233 Ga. App. 802 , 505 SE2d 540 (1998); Fletcher v. Screven County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (SD Ga. 2000); Huguley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 645, 529 SE2d 915 (2000); Lowery v. State, 242 Ga. App. 375, 530 SE2d 22 (2000); Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 529 S.E.2d 129 (2000); Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 538 SE2d 458 (2000); Robertson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 649, 538 SE2d 755 (2000); Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 539 SE2d 545 (2000); Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 570 SE2d 428 (2002); hear v State, 257 Ga. App. 315, 573 SE2d 82 (2002); Damare v. State, 257 Ga. App. 508, 571 SE2d 507 (2002); Jackson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 817, 572 SE2d 360 (2002); Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 371, 606 SE2d 594 (2004); Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. App. 701, 610 SE2d 668 (2005); Harris v. State, 273 Ga. App. 90, 614 SE2d 189 (2005); Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 630 SE2d 783 (2006); Ivey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 232, 644 SE2d 169 (2007); May v. State, 287 Ga. App. 407, 651 SE2d 510 (2007); Brown v. State, 288 Ga. App. 812, 655 SE2d 692 (2007); Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 SE2d 864 (2008); Taul v. State, 290 Ga. App. 288, 659 SE2d 646 (2008); Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 SE2d 897 (2008); Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga. App. 423, 662 SE2d 235 (2008); Branton v. State, 292 Ga. App. 104, 663 SE2d 414 (2008); Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 663 SE2d 721 (2008); Armstrong v. State, 292 Ga. App. 145, 664 SE2d 242 (2008); Carlos v. State, 292 Ga. App. 419, 664 SE2d 808 (2008); Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 SE2d 730 (2008); Adams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 377, 667 SE2d 186 (2008); Gordon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 908, 670 SE2d 533 (2008); Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 SE2d 487 (2009); Hudson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 692, 675 SE2d 578 (2009); In the interests of J. W. B., 296 Ga. App. 131, 673 SE2d 630 (2009); Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7, 700 S.E.2d 564 (2010); Rainly vs. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 SE2d 246 (2010); Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 SE2d 772 (2011); big v State, 312 Ga. App. 362, 718 SE2d 581 (2011); Hall v. State, 313 Ga. App. 66, 720 SE2d 181 (2011); Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 SE2d 492 (2012); Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 SE2d 541 (2012); Sullivan v. Kemp, 293 Ga. 770, 749 S.E.2d 721 (2013); State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 766 S.E.2d 66 (2014); Goodrum v. State, 335 Ga. App. 831, 783 SE2d 354 (2016); In the interest of L.J., 337 Ga. App. 653, 788 SE2d 531 (2016); Harper v. State, 337 Ga. App. 57, 785 SE2d 691 (2016); Williams v. State, 347 Ga. App. 171, 818 SE2d 88 (2018); Parks v. State, 304 Ga. 313, 818 SE.2d 502 (2018); Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614, 825 S.E.2d 188 (2019); Martin v. State, 349 Ga. App. 656, 825 SE2d 227 (2019); Gonzalez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 83, 833 SE2d 727 (2019); Dodson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 412, 838 SE2d 87 (2020).

application

Equally guilty is the accessory to bodily harm.

– If two persons join forces with the mutual intention of attacking another, and in pursuit of that end one commits the actual attack while the other stands by to lend assistance if necessary, and so assists in the commission of the crime, he is also guilty as the one who commits the actual assault, even if that person does not strike. Knight v. State, 52 Ga. App. 199, 182 SE 684 (1935).

– The defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault was upheld as there was no fatal discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment that the defendant unlawfully committed a robbery attack with a knife by holding the knife menacingly while demanding money; The defendant was a conspirator in an armed robbery and the money claims could be attributed to the defendant because the defendant entered the home without permission and held the knife with the blade exposed at the defendant’s side when the defendant’s partner demanded money, and the Victims feared the accused “would do something”. Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 523, 636 S.E.2d 709 (2006), Cert. denied, No. S07C0168, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 99 (Ga. 2007).

– Since the state claimed that the accused threw a lighted lamp at the prosecutor, testimony regarding the fire in the room, the height of the fire, the things burned by the fire and the place where the things were burned than the prosecutor kam wenige Minuten, nachdem sie geflohen war und die Beamten eingetroffen waren, in ihr Haus zurückgekehrt war, war bei der Strafverfolgung wegen Körperverletzung zulässig, da sie spätere Umstände zeigte, die sich aus dem Werfen der brennenden Lampe ergaben und die natürlichen Folgen waren. Harrison gegen Staat, 60 Ga. App. 610, 4 SE2d 602 (1939).

– Da eine einfache Körperverletzung ein Vergehen ist, würde eine unbeabsichtigte Tötung, die unmittelbar aus dieser rechtswidrigen Handlung resultiert, einem fahrlässigen Totschlag und nicht einem Mord gleichkommen. Norrell gegen Staat, 116 Ga. App. 479, 157 SE2d 784 (1967).

– Als der Angeklagte sich weigerte zu gehen, hatte der Beschwerdeführer das Recht, den Angeklagten vom Eigentum des Beschwerdeführers zu verweisen, jedoch mit einer Gewalt, die nicht unverhältnismäßig zu der war, die erforderlich war, um den Angeklagten auszuweisen. Ob Gewalt angewendet wurde, die über das Notwendige hinausging oder nicht, was dem Angeklagten das Recht gab, sich gegen einen ungerechtfertigten Angriff zu verteidigen, aber nicht in einem Ausmaß, das einen Angriff und eine Körperverletzung des Beschwerdeführers darstellt, oder ob der Angeklagte sich willkürlich weigerte zu gehen und eine ungerechtfertigte Körperverletzung begangen hatte, waren alle Fragen an die Geschworenen gemäß den ordnungsgemäßen Anweisungen des Gerichts. Slaughter v. State, 64 Ga. App. 423, 13 SE2d 391 (1941).

– In einer Klage im Rahmen einer Lebensversicherungspolice eine Ausschlussklausel, die den Versicherungsschutz und die Haftung ausschließt, wenn der Schaden aus dem Versuch des Versicherten, einen Angriff zu begehen, resultiert und wenn aus den unbestrittenen Beweisen alle offensichtlichen Umstände bei vernünftiger Betrachtung dazu führen, dass a Person vernünftigerweise eine Gewaltverletzung aus der rechtswidrigen Handlung eines anderen befürchten kann, liegt eine Körperverletzung im Sinne der Ausschlussbestimmung vor. Quaker City Life Ins. Co. gegen Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 115 SE2d 699 (1960).

– Da die Beweise des Staates keinen anderen Angriff als den Angriff mit Raubabsicht mit einer Schrotflinte zeigten, verlor der einfache Angriff seine Identität und wurde mit dem größeren Verbrechen des Angriffs mit Raubabsicht verschmolzen. Alexander gegen Staat, 66 Ga. App. 708, 19 SE2d 353 (1942).

Ob das Zeigen oder das Schwingen der Pistole ein Angriff ist, sollte der Jury überlassen bleiben. Kerbo gegen State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973).

– Das Gericht hat das Ermessen des Gerichts nicht missbraucht, indem es den Antrag des Angeklagten auf ein neues Verfahren abgelehnt hat, weil ausreichende Beweise die Verurteilung des Angeklagten wegen Brandstiftung und schwerer Körperverletzung stützten, basierend auf den Aussagen der Zeugen, die aussagten, dass die Zeugen sehen konnten, wie der Angeklagte das Feuer entfachte die Küchenfenster und sah, wie der Angeklagte mit einer Schrotflinte in Richtung eines Nachbarn und vier Polizeibeamten schoss, die am Tatort waren, sowie das Eingeständnis des Angeklagten, dass der Angeklagte das Feuer gelegt hatte. Jackson gegen Staat, 347 Ga. App. 199, 818 SE2d 268 (2018).

Beim Widerstand gegen eine rechtswidrige Festnahme ist es gerechtfertigt, Gewalt anzuwenden, die vernünftigerweise erforderlich ist, um eine Festnahme zu verhindern, d. Brooks gegen Staat, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 SE2d 593 (1977).

Der Festgenommene ist nur dann berechtigt, den festnehmenden Beamten anzugreifen, wenn der Beamte den Festgenommenen zuerst angegriffen hat. Brooks gegen Staat, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 SE2d 593 (1977).

Die Übermittlung einer terroristischen Bedrohung ist nach dem Gesetz der einfachen Körperverletzung nicht strafbar. Lanthrip gegen State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).

– Die angebliche Drohung des Klägers, einem Kind in den “Arsch” zu treten, wenn das Kind den Hof des Klägers nicht verlässt, stellte keinen einfachen Angriff nach O.C.G.A. dar. § 16-5-20(a), weil der Kläger die angeblich drohende Aussage von einem offenen Fenster aus gemacht hat und derzeit nicht in der Lage war, das Kind, das sich draußen auf einem Fahrrad befand, zu verletzen, mit der Fähigkeit, den Bereich nach Belieben zu verlassen; furthermore, plaintiff’s alleged threat to “kick” the child’s parent’s “ass,” where the parent also happened to be the complaining officer who caused the plaintiff’s arrest, without more, did not constitute a simple assault, since the parent was also outside the house and in no apparent danger from plaintiff. Payne v. Dekalb County, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

One may be guilty of simple assault without violating terroristic threats. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).

No assault when the defendant told the officers the defendant was going into back room to get gun to prevent the officers from arresting the defendant’s mother. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975).

– Defendant’s conduct did constitute simple assault where there was ample evidence upon which jury could reasonably have found that defendant placed victim “in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” McGee v. State, 165 Ga. App. 423, 299 S.E.2d 573 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), where the defendant fired shots towards the victim, who was “having a good time” with a group of other people in the apartment parking lot; the victim’s reasonable apprehensive of receiving a violent injury was sufficient to satisfy the intent element under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Thompson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 323, 626 S.E.2d 825 (2006).

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the evidence established that the victim reasonably apprehended immediate violent injury where, during an exchange between the defendant and the defendant’s spouse, the victim, who had accompanied the spouse, asked the defendant to lower the defendant’s voice, the defendant came after the victim, and, as the victim backed away, the defendant slammed the door shut, yelling “Stay out of it,” walked to the defendant’s car, drove around the parking lot, and returned. Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 629 S.E.2d 596 (2006).

Juvenile court’s adjudication entered against a juvenile on charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats was upheld on appeal given sufficient evidence that: (1) the state adequately showed venue; and (2) the victim’s testimony described the juvenile’s act of pointing a gun, threatening to use the gun, and that such caused fear that something could happen as a result of defendant’s acts. In the Interest of J.A.L., 284 Ga. App. 220, 644 S.E.2d 162 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated assault when after the victim flicked a cigarette that landed on the defendant’s car seat, the defendant said “I’ll shoot you,” and pointed a gun at the victim; although the defendant claimed that the defendant and the victim were just joking around, the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s act placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault because all of the victims were together in a group, and one of the victim’s testified that guns were pointed at everybody; the defendant’s act of firing the weapon into the group made each individual a separate victim, and testimony that the victims were crying and screaming when the defendant fired was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the group too had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court erred in ruling that there was insufficient evidence that the children felt threatened by the firearm because, while there was no direct evidence that the children were injured or were in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, there was evidence that the defendant’s sister and the sister’s boyfriend were terrified of being harmed and the jury could have inferred that the children were aware of the totality of the defendant’s actions and also terrified. State v. Wilkerson, 348 Ga. App. 190, 820 S.E.2d 60 (2018).

– Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer because the defendant drove the stolen white van directly toward the deputies when they attempted to detain him, only missing them when they dove out of the way. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

– When the defendant, while cursing and screaming at the defendant’s parent, stood near the parent, holding a pot of boiling water and staring at the parent, the defendant’s acts constituted aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). They constituted both a substantial step toward committing a battery and a demonstration of violence against the parent, and showed a present ability to inflict injury that placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under § 16-5-20(a)(2). In the Interest of T.Y.B., 288 Ga. App. 610, 654 S.E.2d 688 (2007).

– Defendant’s convictions for family violence battery and simple battery were supported by evidence from the victim that the defendant had slapped the victim and choked the victim, an officer’s observation of red marks around the victim’s neck, and evidence of the defendant’s two prior guilty pleas to batteries against the defendant’s spouse. Evidence of the victim’s fear of retrieving the victim’s children from the house and the defendant’s threats to spread the victim’s brains on the wall supported the simple assault conviction. Cuzzort v. State, 307 Ga. App. 52, 703 S.E.2d 713 (2010).

– Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault on facts arising out of an automobile crash that occurred as defendant was fleeing police, because criminal negligence was an insufficient degree of culpability to support a conviction of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) and because there was no evidence that a police officer attempting to join the chase ever experienced an immediate apprehension of danger before the accident as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) since the officer never saw the suspect’s car. Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 564 S.E.2d 216 (2002).

– Defendant’s convictions for voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), and simple assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a), were supported by evidence that the defendant and others chased down a robber in an unsavory part of town and the defendant stabbed the robber with a knife while the robbery victim shot the robber; under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of the defendant’s accomplices about the defendant’s participation in the crimes was adequately corroborated by each other’s testimony and another eye witness. Woods v. State, 342 Ga. App. 301, 802 S.E.2d 822 (2017).

Not Excessive Force

Officers had probable cause for simple assault arrest and did not use excessive force.

– County police officers were properly granted summary judgment in surviving spouse’s civil rights action, arising from the fatal shooting of the decedent when the decedent broke into the decedent’s own house as officers did not use excessive force by using tasers on two occasions because the decedent refused to put the knife down or heed the officers’ instructions, and the officers had probable cause to arrest the decedent for simple assault or obstruction of officers, and it was reasonable to believe that the decedent posed a danger. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).

– When a decedent was tased once in the prong mode during an arrest, and all subsequent tasings were in the dry stun mode, a deputy and an officer were entitled to qualified immunity as to an excessive force claim because the illegality of their behavior was not clearly established at the time since their conduct did not rise to the level of “obvious clarity,” because, inter alia, the decedent committed assault and battery on a police officer, the decedent’s acts were contemporaneous with repeated threats to kill the deputy, and the decedent resisted during the entire time that they tried to handcuff the decedent. Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 138, 184 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2012).

– Evidence of the defendant’s prior drug use and history of crimes committed against family members fueled by drug usage were properly admitted as relevant to the crimes charged, despite incidentally placing the defendant’s character in issue; thus, convictions for both aggravated assault and simple assault were upheld on appeal. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 812, 642 S.E.2d 887 (2007).

– Because the defendant was aware the victim was the judicial officer responsible for defendant’s arrest, had a face-to-face encounter with the victim within 48 hours after the arrest, and because the defendant had made a profane threat of physical violence against the victim, defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of simple assault despite defendant’s argument that the threat against the victim was justified because the victim first said the victim would put defendant back in jail. Wells v. State, 204 Ga. App. 91, 418 S.E.2d 438 (1992).

In an altercation where the victim was shot by defendant’s codefendant, even though defendant did not hit the victim, there was evidence of defendant’s threats against the victim and other actions sufficient to convict the defendant of simple assault; because defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault, however, defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution to the victim for gunshot wounds inflicted by the codefendant. Rider v. State, 210 Ga. App. 716, 437 S.E.2d 493 (1993).

Defendant’s aggressive driving, the defendant’s act of following the victim, the defendant’s estranged spouse, in the defendant’s vehicle after the victim left the hospital, yelling at the victim, impeding the victim’s movement, forcing the victim into oncoming lanes of traffic, and, on several occasions, bumping the victim’s car, constituted at least simple assault in that it placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

Evidence supported guilt since the defendant tried to steal DVD players from a store, tried to hit an employee, and resisted arrest. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 176, 582 S.E.2d 141 (2003).

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts against the defendant for false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and simple assault in regard to acts of domestic violence against the victim, the defendant’s spouse, as the evidence showed that the defendant dragged the spouse down a hallway by the spouse’s hair and held the spouse in a bedroom against the spouse’s will, that the defendant broke the spouse’s nose and arm, and that the defendant beat the spouse with a car-washing brush. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. App. 486, 585 S.E.2d 913 (2003).

Factfinder was allowed to find the defendant’s hands to have been deadly weapons depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim’s injuries; the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault where the defendant punched the victim in the face, shattering the victim’s nose, and causing an injury so severe that the victim was required to undergo surgery. Lewis v. State, 263 Ga. App. 98, 587 S.E.2d 245 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. State, 310 Ga. App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (2011).

Where the record revealed that the defendant and the defendant’s love interest went to a party together, that the defendant became enraged when the defendant’s love interest and another left the party without telling the defendant, and that upon returning home, the defendant strangled the defendant’s love interest, whom the defendant had a history of abusing, and the defendant assaulted the other person, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for malice murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and simple assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20. Rickman v. State, 277 Ga. 277, 587 S.E.2d 596 (2003).

Testimony about how sound traveled from the kitchen to the den and the victim’s comments concerning how the defendant could keep tabs on where the victim was constituted sufficient evidence to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant knew where the victim was in the small kitchen and intentionally fired the defendant’s gun at the victim through the upstairs flooring just above the site the victim was occupying in the kitchen, intending to inflict violent injury upon the victim and, thus, to establish that the defendant committed a simple assault. Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 592 S.E.2d 656 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant committed an assault against the victims where the evidence showed that after one of the victims separated defendant and the defendant’s sibling who were involved in a minor altercation, the defendant left and came back with a gun, which the defendant fired into the truck in which the victims were sitting; accordingly, the evidence showed the defendant intended to commit violence to the person of another. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions on one count of simple assault and two counts of battery, which arose from a fight with a romantic friend, as it was within the jury’s province to consider defendant’s self-defense theory and reject that defense; the jury heard witnesses and observed testimony and was more capable of determining the reasonableness of the hypothesis produced by the evidence or lack of evidence than the appellate court. Thompson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (2008).

Defendant’s acts sufficient to cause the victim to retreat and to generate a reasonable fear that the defendant intended to inflict injury upon the victim, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant committed assault. Holbrook v. State, 168 Ga. App. 380, 308 S.E.2d 869 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of simple assault after demonstrating violence through verbal threats and damage to property, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury, causing victims to reasonably fear injury unless they retreated to secure their safety. Lewis v. State, 253 Ga. App. 578, 560 S.E.2d 73 (2002).

Criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in cases of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on either O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) or (a)(2). Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998), overruling Osborne v. State, 228 Ga. App. 758, 492 S.E.2d 732 (1007) and Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).

Criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in proving the commission of an aggravated assault. Cadle v. State, 271 Ga. App. 595, 610 S.E.2d 574 (2005).

– Appellant’s convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses were reversed because the Georgia Supreme Court could not say that the trial court’s erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that the appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury returned. Strong v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 653 (2020).

– See Wells v. State, 178 Ga. App. 82, 342 S.E.2d 21 (1986); Larkin v. State, 191 Ga. App. 269, 381 S.E.2d 421 (1989); King v. State, 213 Ga. App. 268, 444 S.E.2d 381 (1994); Richards v. State, 222 Ga. App. 853, 476 S.E.2d 598 (1996); Veal v. State, 242 Ga. App. 873, 531 S.E.2d 422 (2000).

Evidence that defendant shot the victim in the face with a handgun was sufficient to show defendant committed “violent injury to the person of another.” Johnson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 863, 485 S.E.2d 551 (1997).

Rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant’s parents/victims both testified that the parents were afraid of the defendant and the defendant had the capability of carrying out threats. Paul v. State, 231 Ga. App. 528, 499 S.E.2d 914 (1998).

When the evidence established more than the defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the crimes, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and simple assault; although the defendant was not indicted for conspiracy, the evidence also supported a conspiracy charge. Belsar v. State, 276 Ga. 261, 577 S.E.2d 569 (2003).

Aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal, based on the defendant’s act of deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another; moreover, the fact that one of the defendant’s cohorts also fired a weapon in the direction of the shooting victims was sufficient for defendant to be guilty as a party to said criminal acts. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for the simple assault of the defendant’s older child. The child and a sibling testified to the defendant’s violent behavior on the night in question, and their testimony was corroborated by statements they and the defendant’s live-in companion made to a detective and by property damage observed by the detective; furthermore, the older child testified that the child was afraid that night that the defendant might hit the child, that the defendant had previously pushed the child when angry, and that the defendant had a history of abusing persons of the opposite sex. Bearden v. State, 291 Ga. App. 805, 662 S.E.2d 736 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s convictions for false imprisonment, simple assault, and criminal trespass with regard to actions the defendant took toward the victim, who was a prior romantic friend, as the evidence established that the defendant went to the victim’s home uninvited and entered the home; as the victim exited the bathroom, the defendant was standing in the hallway in front of the victim; alarmed, the victim attempted to flee into an adjacent room at which time the victim and the defendant struggled as the defendant attempted to prevent the victim from passing the defendant; once in the adjacent room, the defendant took the telephone from the victim as the victim tried to call9-1-1; and the victim ultimately pushed out the screen and successfully exited the residence through an open window despite the defendant’s attempt to pull the victim back inside. Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (2008).

Based on a child’s testimony that the defendant hit the child with the defendant’s car after attempting to hit the child’s parent, as well as the corroborating testimony of three other witnesses, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant assaulted the child with the car. Barnes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 493, 675 S.E.2d 233 (2009).

Conviction of assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), was supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant shouted at the victim in an agitated and angry manner, while standing in close proximity to the victim and blocking the victim’s movement, the defendant had the apparent present ability to inflict injury, and the victim testified that the victim feared that the defendant might harm the victim; eyewitnesses also testified that the eyewitnesses feared for the victim’s safety. The victim’s fear was also shown by the fact that the victim was trying to escape the defendant’s immediate presence, but was prevented from doing so by the defendant’s actions. Daniels v. State, 298 Ga. App. 736, 681 S.E.2d 642 (2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1(b), aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), because the victim’s testimony that the defendant raped, sodomized, punched, burned, and threatened to kill the victim was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s convictions. Harris v. State, 308 Ga. App. 523, 707 S.E.2d 908 (2011).

– Evidence that, during an argument, the defendant grabbed the defendant’s spouse by the arms and threw the spouse to the ground, and then grabbed the back of the spouse’s head, pushed the spouse down into the floor, and twisted the spouse’s arm behind the spouse’s back was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for simple assault. Pettis v. State, 350 Ga. App. 421, 829 S.E.2d 613 (2019).

– Although the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the father committed an assault against the mother when the father threatened the mother and pointed a gun at the mother outside their home, because that incident took place outside the presence of the children, as the uncontradicted record showed that the children were inside the house asleep, there was no evidence that any of the children saw or heard the exchange between their mother and father, and none of the testimony offered by the Department of Family and Children Services established an act of abuse on the part of the father sufficient to warrant a finding of dependency; thus, there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find the father’s children dependent. In the Interest of K. D., 344 Ga. App. 423, 810 S.E.2d 193 (2018).

– There was sufficient evidence that the defendant, a juvenile, committed acts that would constitute simple assault if done by an adult since while in a vice principal’s office, the defendant took off the defendant’s outer clothing and watch, made fists, squared the defendant’s shoulders, and asked the vice principal, “Now what are you going to do?”; the vice principal testified that the vice principal felt threatened, and there was evidence of a present ability to inflict injury in that although the distance between the defendant and the vice principal was greater than an arm’s length, they were standing in a confined office. In the Interest of D.B., 284 Ga. App. 445, 644 S.E.2d 305 (2007).

– Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault, as: (1) the defendant previously threatened to kill the victim; (2) the defendant pointed a gun at the victim, warned the victim not to give information to the police about what they did, and said, “We own this area”; (3) the frightened victim told the defendant to leave; and (4) the defendant left after further words were exchanged. Husband v. State, 275 Ga. App. 246, 620 S.E.2d 479 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and simple battery because the perpetrator of a robbery entered a business wearing a mask, opened the cash drawer, an employee closed the drawer shut and locked it, the perpetrator and the employee then fought over the key to the drawer, leaving bruises on the employee’s arm, the employee testified that the perpetrator had a shirt wrapped around the perpetrator’s hand and it appeared that the perpetrator held a gun, the defendant then fled from police, within 10 minutes of the robbery both the employee and a customer identified the defendant as the perpetrator, and later, the defendant admitted that a hat found at the scene of the robbery belonged to the defendant. Lawson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 334, 620 S.E.2d 600 (2005).

Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for acquittal as a matter of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction on four counts of assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20 and16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant and the perpetrator’s codefendant committed two home invasions, whereupon the victims therein were fearful, some were harmed, and during the incidents, the defendant held a night stick and instructed the victims to cooperate with the perpetrator’s codefendant, who brandished a handgun. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on grounds that the state failed to prove that the defendant intentionally threatened two deputies the defendant forced off the road with a car, given evidence that prior to driving directly at the deputies, the car was being used offensively toward others by forcing those individuals off the road, and thereafter, in driving toward the two deputies at 90 miles per hour, a jury could infer that the defendant intended to threaten the deputies in hopes of forcing them from the road. Adams v. State, 280 Ga. App. 779, 634 S.E.2d 868 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to present any evidence that the state ever threatened the victim into testifying against the defendant, and the defendant failed to acknowledge that the victim’s statement to police would have been tendered into evidence regardless of what version of events were recounted on the stand, the appeals court rejected the defendant’s claim that the state’s coercion of the victim warranted reversal of a simple assault conviction. Wheeler v. State, 281 Ga. App. 158, 635 S.E.2d 415 (2006).

Jury was entitled to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, charged in the indictment “with the intent to rob,” based on the corroboration of the defendant’s admission to going on a “lick,” which meant to go find someone to rob, and that the defendant knew what a passenger was going to do when that passenger reached out of the car window in an attempt to snatch the elderly victim’s purse, resulting in the victim being struck by the car and falling to the ground; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s amended motion for a new trial. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 506, 636 S.E.2d 694 (2006).

Because the state showed that the victim had an apprehension, reasonable under the circumstances, of immediately receiving a violent injury, this testimony, if believed, together with a finding that the defendant intended to drive rapidly out of the car wash while dragging the victim, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault; further, an assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require that a defendant act with criminal intent in regard to the victim, but did require that an intentional act be shown. Kirkland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 331, 638 S.E.2d 784 (2006).

Because sufficient evidence was presented showing that the defendant cut a correctional officer’s face with either a razor blade or other sharp object, requiring more than 150 stitches and cosmetic surgery to repair, the defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery upon a correctional officer were upheld on appeal. White v. State, 289 Ga. App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 567 (2008).

Testimony of both an aggravated assault victim and another witness, which demonstrated that the defendant shot the victim in the leg, coupled with the defendant’s flight after the incident, was sufficient to support the defendant’s aggravated assault conviction. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 219, 656 S.E.2d 556 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 381 (Ga. 2008).

With regard to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim’s testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim’s car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed the intent necessary to commit aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), and felony murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c), because the defendant used a vehicle as an offensive weapon while the defendant was extremely drunk, and the evidence was sufficient to prove both forms of simply assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)-(2) by the defendant against all six of the victims; the defendant engaged in an extended high-speed car chase with a driver, deliberately rammed the other driver’s truck, and attempted to smash into the other driver head-on after the truck stalled, and within minutes after the driver escaped, the defendant came upon the other five victims by swerving sharply into oncoming traffic and slamming into a vehicle. Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 690 S.E.2d 406 (2010).

Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault on victims were supported by sufficient evidence despite the lack of evidence of the victims’ mental state; assault included an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), so when two gang members attempted to commit violent injuries on their pursuers by intentionally firing guns at the pursuers, the defendant could be guilty as a party to these aggravated assaults and felony murder. Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 781 S.E.2d 777 (2016).

– Police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for simple assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) based on: (a) the statements of defendant’s wife that he tried to force her to have sex against her will, became angry when she rebuffed him, and then threw against a wall the vacuum cleaner that she was using; and (b) evidence at the scene which bolstered the wife’s story. The fact that defendant was ultimately acquitted of the simple assault did not invalidate the arrest. Lammerding v. State, 255 Ga. App. 606, 565 S.E.2d 908 (2002).

– Trial court did not err in declining to merge a defendant’s convictions for assault and kidnapping with bodily injury because assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) was established by evidence that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when defendant told the victim the defendant had a gun, and kidnapping with bodily injury in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), on the other hand, was established by evidence that defendant abducted and held the victim against the victim’s will in the victim’s car, driving from one location to another, during which time the victim received bodily injuries. Walker v. State, 306 Ga. App. 16, 701 S.E.2d 523 (2010).

– Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant’s convictions for simply assault and battery because the convictions were based upon different conduct as the first cut to the victim’s forehead caused reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury supporting the simple assault conviction, and the victim’s remaining injuries caused by the knife wounds that followed supported a finding of visible bodily harm to support the battery conviction and each crime required proof of a fact that the other did not. Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289, 739 S.E.2d 129 (2013).

– Trial court erred in denying the defendant juvenile’s motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify a delinquency adjudication for the offense of simple assault because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of delinquency since, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the crime of simple assault required proof that the defendant’s actions placed the defendant’s grandmother in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, but the only evidence of that fact was hearsay; a police officer, who was the only witness, testified that the grandmother told the officer that the grandmother was afraid of the defendant, and that the defendant was perhaps going to hit the grandmother, but the officer admitted that there were no allegations that the defendant attempted to hit the grandmother, nor did the officer witness any of the alleged events. In the Interest of J. L. K., 302 Ga. App. 844, 691 S.E.2d 892 (2010).

Evidence was insufficient to support a juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault because the state failed to prove that the juvenile placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when the juvenile placed the juvenile’s hands in the victim’s pockets to see what the victim was carrying. The evidence did not show that the juvenile assaulted the victim by attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of the victim, and there was no evidence that the juvenile demonstrated violence through physical acts or gestures. In the Interest of D.M., 308 Ga. App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (2011).

– Evidence did not support the adjudication of delinquency for simple assault because the officer testified that the defendant juvenile turned toward the officer while the officer’s hand was on the defendant’s back and that the defendant remained in the same location during the entire encounter; no reasonable fact finder could interpret the officer’s use of the word “charge” to mean violently rushing toward the officer; and the officer’s testimony did not show that the defendant’s turning toward the officer caused the officer to apprehend immediately receiving a violent injury as the officer’s testimony was that the officer apprehended that the officer might receive physical or bodily injury. In the Interest of T. P., Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 21, 2020).

– Defendant’s sentence to 10 years for false imprisonment, 12 months for sexual battery, and 12 months for simple battery, to run concurrently, provided that upon service of four years in custody, the defendant could serve the remaining six years on probation, was not void as the sentence fell within the allowable sentencing ranges of no less than one nor more than 10 years for false imprisonment, and up to 12 months each for sexual battery and simple battery. Rehberger v. State, 267 Ga. App. 778, 600 S.E.2d 635 (2004).

– Any error in the admission of a witness’s statements under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt for assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, including the exact match of the defendant’s blood sample to the blood found at the scene, the location and timing of the defendant’s capture, and the fact that the defendant had a recent gunshot wound. Porter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 513, 621 S.E.2d 523 (2005).

Jury Instruction

Charge on simple assault not required.

– When, according to the evidence, either the defendant committed a battery or an aggravated assault or did nothing at all, a charge on simple assault is not required. Sheffield v. State, 124 Ga. App. 295, 183 S.E.2d 525 (1971).

Trial court is not required to charge the jury on simple assault where a battery is actually committed. Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983).

When there is no question of simple assault, the failure to charge simple assault in explanation of the elements of aggravated assault is harmless error because it is highly probable the error does not contribute to the judgment. Wilkie v. State, 153 Ga. App. 609, 266 S.E.2d 289 (1980).

If defendant committed a simple assault with a deadly weapon, the offense is aggravated assault, and a charge on simple assault was not warranted. Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (2000).

Trial court’s jury instructions in the defendant’s criminal trial on multiple charges arising out of a domestic dispute were proper, as: (1) there was no requirement that the jury be instructed on the element of assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) in order to be properly instructed on the crime of aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21); (2) the methods of committing an aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were properly defined based on the methods asserted in the indictment; (3) there was no support for a requested charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); and (4) there was no possibility of a lesser included conviction for false imprisonment (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41), such that instruction only on the indicted offense of kidnapping (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40) was proper. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in failing to give a charge on the lesser-included offense of simple battery, as the defendant failed to request the same in writing, at or before the close of the evidence, and an oral request to give such a charge was insufficient. Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 635 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

In the defendant’s prosecution for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 because the defendant’s spouse could have reasonably apprehended that the black microrecorder allegedly in the defendant’s hand was a gun. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. App. 694, 647 S.E.2d 370 (2007).

Defendant was accused of hitting the victim in the head with a beer bottle, cutting the victim’s head and requiring stitches. The evidence allowed the jury to either find that the defendant had not committed an aggravated assault, or to find the defendant guilty as charged; the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included-charge of simple assault as there was no evidence to support that charge. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678 (2008).

Because the evidence showed that defendant committed an assault with intent and a deadly weapon, the crime constituted an aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); therefore, a charge on the lesser-included offenses of simple assault or reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) and16-5-60(b) was not warranted. Paul v. State, 296 Ga. App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (2009).

During the defendant’s trial for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on simple assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a), as an essential element of aggravated assault because the record failed to indicate that the defendant submitted a written request to charge on simple assault, and the trial court’s instruction was sufficient to define the offense charged and provided a proper guideline for the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 577, 705 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient due to counsel’s failure to request a jury charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of aggravated assault because there was no evidence showing that the defendant committed merely simple assault; the evidence showed that the defendant’s assault upon the victim was with a screwdriver within the purview of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Because defendant intentionally shot the victim, wounded the victim, chased the victim down, and intentionally shot the victim three more times as the victim begged for the victim’s life, and as neither negligence nor reckless conduct was an issue, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a) in connection with the court’s charge on aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 713 S.E.2d 826 (2011).

Trial court did not plainly err in the court’s jury instruction on aggravated assault when the trial court’s instructions included the definition of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and tracked the applicable definition of simple assault in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1). Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 725 S.E.2d 305 (2012).

In an aggravated assault case, the trial court properly charged the jury with the applicable assault definition by requiring that the defendant assault the victim with a deadly weapon, and that the act placed another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, but by stating that an actual injury to the victim need not be shown; a charge on simple assault was not required simply because the victim suffered no injury. Marshall v. State, 324 Ga. App. 348, 750 S.E.2d 418 (2013).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge simple assault as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, alleging aggravated assault by placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury with an object which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury, as the defendant was either guilty of aggravated assault or not guilty at all because it was undisputed that the defendant hit the victim and pinned the victim against a mobile home while driving the van toward the victim from only about 20 feet away and that the defendant’s action resulted in serious bodily injury to the victim. Patterson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 221, 770 S.E.2d 62 (2015), aff’d, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

In the defendant’s trial for aggravated assault by shooting the victim, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the complete definition of simple assault; there was no danger of the jury convicting the defendant of aggravated assault solely for placing the victim in apprehension of receiving a violent injury. Hollins v. State, 340 Ga. App. 190, 796 S.E.2d 901 (2017).

In the defendant’s trial for aggravated assault after threatening the defendant’s stepfather with two knives, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense because, based upon the form of aggravated assault alleged, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant was either guilty of aggravated assault or was justified. Johnson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 540, 823 S.E.2d 853 (2019).

– With regard to defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery of a taxi driver, defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of battery based on defendant’s argument that the jury could have found under the facts of the case that the gun was not used as a deadly weapon as the evidence showed without conflict that defendant’s physical assault upon the taxi driver with the handgun caused the taxi driver to bleed from the head and the entire right side of the face, and the taxi driver testified that, during the attack, the taxi driver was very afraid of being killed. Thus, the pistol in the case, if used in the manner testified to by the taxi driver, was per se a deadly weapon, and the offense was either aggravated assault or no offense at all. Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga. App. 378, 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1851, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 2008).

– After threatening to kill the victim, because the defendant’s actions in continuing to drive away, as the victim was caught on the outside of the car screaming, supported the crime of either aggravated or simple assault, and not simple negligence, the trial court did not err in rejecting a reckless conduct instruction. Martin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 652, 642 S.E.2d 340 (2007).

– With regard to the defendant’s convictions for criminal trespass, simple assault, and battery, the trial court did not err in failing to give jury charges on the affirmative defense of justification because the evidence was insufficient to support such a defense as the defendant admitted that in the time it took the defendant to rip an air conditioning unit from the window and break in, the allegedly pursuing assailants had stopped chasing the defendant and had gone home. Miller v. State, 335 Ga. App. 58, 778 S.E.2d 424 (2015).

– Two charged methods of committing simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) and (a)(2), as an element of aggravated assault, did not provide an improper basis for the jury to convict the defendant of aggravated assault as the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense; because the jury’s charge did not authorize a conviction in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, the charge was not erroneous and the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape was affirmed. McGuire v. State, 266 Ga. App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (2004).

Because the defendant’s conduct put the officer-victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately sustaining a violent injury, which satisfied the elements required to prove simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the trial court properly charged the jury on simple assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault upon a police officer. Bostic v. State, 289 Ga. App. 195, 656 S.E.2d 546 (2008).

Trial court was authorized to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple assault because some evidence showed that the defendant attempted to violently injure a store manager by stabbing the manager with a pen with such force that the defendant bent the pen; the fact that actual contact occurred did not diminish the fact that there was evidence of a simple assault. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Trial court’s jury charge on aggravated assault was not erroneous because the trial court properly tailored the court’s charge to the allegation in the indictment by charging the jury with just the relevant portion of the simple assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1); the trial court did as the court was required and delivered a charge tailored to the indictment. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

– When the accused was convicted of assaulting a female under the age of fourteen years with the intent to rape her, and in the defendant’s statement to the jury the defendant denied committing any assault or assault and battery upon the female, while the evidence of the female, if true, proved the felonious assault as alleged in the indictment, failure of the court to charge the jury on the law of assault, or assault and battery, was not error. Finney v. State, 51 Ga. App. 545, 181 S.E. 144 (1935).

Two city police officers who shot at prosecutor’s car 12 times, finally causing the prosecutor to run the car off a bridge some 12 miles outside the city limits, after which they arrested the prosecutor, where they had no warrant for the prosecutor’s arrest and no crime had been committed by the prosecutor in their presence, were guilty of shooting at another, and failure of the court to charge on simple assault in the absence of a timely and appropriate written request was not error. Hart v. State, 55 Ga. App. 85, 189 S.E. 547 (1936).

When the theory that the defendant could have been found guilty of a simple assault rather than assault with intent to rob and that the judge should have charged thereon was sustained only by the defendant’s statement to the jury, without a proper request the judge did not commit reversible error in failing to charge on the law of assault. Alexander v. State, 66 Ga. App. 708, 19 S.E.2d 353 (1942).

Trial court erred in quashing an aggravated assault count against defendant because, in part, the indictment did not need to additionally charge the language of simple assault in order to withstand demurrer. State v. Tate, 262 Ga. App. 311, 585 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

Although the trial court erred by instructing the jury on assault, the instruction did not likely affect the outcome of the proceedings nor did it seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings as the jury was provided with the indictment and the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) for assault as charged in the accusation. Driskell v. State, 333 Ga. App. 886, 777 S.E.2d 717 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0191, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 115 (Ga. 2016).

– Appellate review of the trial court’s decision not to give a charge on the lesser included offense of simple assault was waived because trial counsel admitted that counsel acquiesced and did not further object to the trial court’s decision to not give the charge. Gunter v. State, 316 Ga. App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (2012).

– In the trial of one accused of murder, it is reversible error for the court in charging the jury to assume or intimate that the accused had “assaulted” the deceased when the evidence and the defendant’s statement did not demand a finding that an assault had been made. Tyner v. State, 70 Ga. App. 56, 27 S.E.2d 351 (1943).

With regard to a defendant’s conviction for the felony murder of the defendant’s spouse, with aggravated assault as the underlying felony, the trial court erred by refusing the defendant’s requested charge on involuntary manslaughter with pointing a pistol at another as the predicate misdemeanor, which entitled the defendant to a new trial based on the defendant testifying that the shooting occurred inadvertently when, in the course of horseplay with the pistol, the defendant pulled the trigger while pointing the pistol at the victim’s head, not knowing there was a round in the chamber. Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661 (2007).

Trial court erred by failing to provide the statutory definition of assault, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20, in a jury charge, which resulted in the final charge being fatally insufficient since the charge did not instruct on substantive points and issues involved in the case and allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault based merely on criminal negligence. As a result, defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault was reversed and a retrial was ordered since there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction. Coney v. State, 290 Ga. App. 364, 659 S.E.2d 768 (2008).

– When an indictment for aggravated assault alleged the aggravating aspect of simple assault, this was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the defendant could be convicted for aggravated assault if the defendant committed a simple assault in either manner contained in the simple assault statute; accordingly, the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the jury could convict the defendant for aggravated assault in a manner not alleged in the indictment. Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 589 S.E.2d 90 (2003).

Two charged methods of committing simple assault, as an element of aggravated assault, did not provide an improper basis for the jury to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, and the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense; hence, because the jury’s charge did not authorize a conviction in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, the charge was not erroneous. Opio v. State, 283 Ga. App. 894, 642 S.E.2d 906 (2007).

Trial court did not refuse to charge on simple assault because the trial court gave verbatim the charge that the defendant complained was not given. Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

– Requested charges on involuntary manslaughter, pointing a firearm at another, and simple assault, were properly refused, where defendant’s testimony (that defendant fired shots with the intention of frightening a group) established as a matter of law the offense of aggravated assault, and the testimony that members of the group were frightened and dropped to the ground was inconsistent with the requested charges. Hawkins v. State, 260 Ga. 138, 390 S.E.2d 836 (1990).

Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault with an object under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) with regard to pinning the victim to a house with a vehicle was affirmed because the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included crimes of reckless conduct and reckless driving since the base crime of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require a specific intent to cause the victim to be apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority of Georgia Crime Information Center to maintain records of crimes.

– Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to maintain records of reported crime and, in some instances, to record information identifying persons charged with the commission of crime; however, the center is not authorized to maintain records identifying persons charged with disorderly conduct except when the charge is directly connected with or directly related to certain statutory offenses including simple assault. 1976 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 76-33.

For an update of crimes and offenses for which the Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to collect and file identifying data, see 1991 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 91-35.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

– 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, §§ 1 et seq., 3, 4.

– 6A C.J.S., Assault, § 79 et seq.

– Recovery for physical consequences of fright resulting in a physical injury, 11 A.L.R. 1119; 40 A.L.R. 983; 76 A.L.R. 681; 98 A.L.R. 402.

Liability of tort-feasor for consequences of act induced by fear aroused by tort, 35 A.L.R. 1447.

Indecent proposal to woman as assault, 12 A.L.R.2d 971.

Truant or attendance officer’s liability for assault and battery or false imprisonment, 62 A.L.R.2d 1328.

Civil liability of one instigating or inciting an assault or assault and battery notwithstanding primary or active participant therein has been absolved of liability, 72 A.L.R.2d 1229.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense, 79 A.L.R.2d 597.

Unintentional killing of or injury to third person during attempted self-defense, 55 A.L.R.3d 620.

Antagonistic defenses as ground for separate trials of codefendants in criminal case, 82 A.L.R.3d 245.

Criminal responsibility for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 99 A.L.R.3d 854.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense, 93 A.L.R.5th 683.

Criminal offense in which the unlawful physical action occurs in response to a threat

This article is about the crime. For the prohibited aspects of the battery, see Battery (crimes) . For other uses of the word “battery” see battery

Battery is a criminal offense involving unlawful physical contact, and is distinct from assault, which involves creating a fear of such contact.

Battery is a specific common law offense, although the term is used more broadly to refer to any unlawful abusive physical contact with another person. Battery is defined in American common law as “any unlawful and/or unwanted contact with the person of another by the attacker or by any substance set in motion by the attacker”.[1] In more severe cases, and for all types in some jurisdictions, it is primarily defined by statutory wording. The rating of a battery’s severity is determined by local laws.

General [edit]

Specific regulations related to batteries vary by jurisdiction, but some elements remain the same in all jurisdictions. Battery generally requires the following:

an offensive touch or contact is made with the victim, instigated by the actor; and the actor intends or knows that his action will cause the offensive touch.

Under the US Model Penal Code and in some jurisdictions, assault is when the actor acts recklessly without the specific intent of causing offensive contact. Battery is usually classified as either easy or difficult. Although rechargeable batteries typically appear in the context of physical altercations, they can also arise in other circumstances, such as medical cases where a doctor is performing an unauthorized medical procedure.

Specific countries[ edit ]

Canada[ edit ]

Batteries are not defined in the Canadian Criminal Code. Instead, the code provides a criminal offense of assault and assault.

England and Wales[edit]

Battery is a common law offense in England and Wales.

As with most offenses in the UK, it has two elements:

Actus reus: The accused unlawfully touched the victim or used force

Mens rea: The defendant intended or was reckless in relation to the unlawful touch or use of force

This offense is a crime against autonomy, with more violent crimes such as ABH and GBH being statutory offenses under the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861.

Even the slightest touch can amount to an illegal use of force.[2] However, it is assumed that everyday encounters (e.g. making contact on public transport) are permitted and not punishable.[3]

Much confusion can arise between the terms “attack” and “battery”. In everyday usage, the term assault can be used to describe a physical attack that is actually a battery. An attack causes someone to fear that they may become a victim of a battery. This problem is so pervasive that the crime of sexual assault [4] is better termed sexual battery. This confusion stems from the fact that both attack and battery can be called ordinary attack. In practice, the wording used to charge such an offense is “bluffing by beating”, which, however, has the same meaning as “battery”.

There is no separate offense for a domestic violence battery; However, the introduction of the offense of ‘controlling or coercing conduct in an intimate or family relationship’ in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015[5] has resulted in new prosecution guidelines[6] which include significant aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, resulting in potentially longer imprisonment for domestic violence assault.

Whether it is a criminal offense[edit]

In DPP v. Taylor, DPP v. Little[7], assault was found to be an offense falling within Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.[8] This decision was criticized in Haystead v. DPP[9], in which the Divisional Court expressed the Obiter opinion that battery remains a common law offence.

While it is perhaps a better view that assault and assault have statutory penalties rather than being statutory offences, it is nevertheless the case that pending review by a higher court, DPP v. Little is the preferred authority.[10]

Negotiation and judgment mode[ edit ]

In England and Wales, assault is a summary offense under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. However, a charge may be brought under Section 40 where another offense based on the same facts or together with those forming part of a series of offenses is also charged is of a similar character. When it comes to prosecution, a Crown Court has no greater jurisdiction than a Magistrates’ Court.

It is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of six months or a fine not exceeding step 5 on the regulatory scale, or both.

Russia[ edit ]

There is an offense that could (loosely) be called a battery in Russia. Article 116[11] of the Russian Criminal Code provides that assault or similar violent acts that cause pain are criminal offenses.

Scotland[ edit ]

There is no clear battery offense in Scotland. The criminal offense of bodily harm includes acts that could be described as bodily harm.

United States[edit]

In the United States, criminal battery, or simple battery, is the use of violence against others that results in harmful or abusive contact, including sexual contact.[12] By common law, a simple battery is a misdemeanor. The prosecutor must prove all three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:[13]

an unlawful use of force on the person of another resulting in either physical harm or offensive touch.

The common law elements serve as a basic template, but individual jurisdictions may change them, and they may vary slightly from state to state.

Under modern legal systems, the battery is often divided into classes that determine the severity of the punishment. For example:

A simple battery can include any form of non-consensual harmful or abusive contact, regardless of the injury caused. Criminal Battery requires intent to cause injury to another.

may include some form of non-consensual harmful or abusive contact, regardless of the injury caused. A criminal battery requires inflicting injury on another. Sexual battery can be defined as non-consensual touching of another’s intimate parts. In Florida at least, “sexual battery means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object”: See Section 794.011. [14]

can be defined as non-consensual touching of another’s privates. In Florida at least, “sexual battery means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object”: See Section 794.011. The scope of domestic violence can be narrowed between people within a certain degree of relationship: legislation has been enacted to deal with the crime in response to increasing awareness of the problem of domestic violence.

may be restricted in its scope between individuals within a certain degree of relationship: legislation has been enacted to address the offense in response to increasing awareness of the problem of domestic violence. Aggravated assault is generally considered a major offense of criminal offenses. Aggravated battery charges can occur when a battery causes serious personal injury or permanent disfigurement. As a successor to the common law crime of chaos, this is sometimes subsumed under the definition of grievous bodily harm. In Florida, aggravated battery is the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm and a second-degree felony,[15] while battery inadvertently causing grievous bodily harm is considered a third-degree felony.[16]

Kansas [edit]

In the state of Kansas, battery is defined as follows:[17]

Battery. (a) Battery is: (1) knowingly or recklessly causing physical harm to another person; or (2) knowingly causing physical contact with another person when doing so in a rude, abusive, or angry manner.

Louisiana[ edit ]

The battery law in Louisiana reads:[18]

Section 33. Battery defines Battery is the willful use of force or force against the person of another; or the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.

Jurisdictional differences[edit]

In some jurisdictions, battery has recently been engineered to involve directing bodily waste (i.e. spitting) at another person without their permission. Some of these jurisdictions automatically charge such a battery to the burden of an aggravated battery. In some jurisdictions, criminal assault charges also require proof of a mental state (mens rea). The terminology used to refer to a specific offense may also vary by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions, such as New York, label what would be assault under common law as assault and then use a different term for the crime that would have been assault, such as assault. B. Threat.

Distinguishing between battery and battery

A typical overt behavior of an attack is Person A chasing Person B and swinging a fist at their head. The one for battery is a prominent B.

Battery required:

an act of will, that

leads to harmful or abusive contact with another person and

committed for the purpose of causing harmful or offensive contact, or in circumstances that make such contact substantially safe, or with reckless disregard for whether such contact will result.

Bodily harm, as rooted in English law, is attempted bodily harm or the act of willfully causing a person to fear harmful or abusive contact with himself. Elsewhere it is often worded similarly to the threat of violence against a person, while grievous bodily harm is the threat with the clear and existing ability and willingness to carry it out. Aggraved Battery is typically an offensive touch without a tool or weapon in an attempt to injure or restrain.

See also[edit]

Battery is a willful tort. When a person intentionally causes harmful or abusive contact with another person, it is assault. However, if the plaintiff has expressly consented to such action or has implicitly consented by participating in a particular event or situation (e.g., playing sports with the defendant), then he is not liable.

Intentional action means that a person acted with a desire to bring about the contact or knows that the consequences of that contact have a high probability of occurring. Such action must result in harmful or abusive contact.

Harmful contact with a battery is contact that causes physical harm or injury, while obnoxious contact with a battery is contact by which a reasonable person with ordinary sensibilities feels threatened. The offensive contact is usually subject to the objective test, but when the accused knows that a plaintiff is an overly sensitive person, but a reasonable person does not feel that the offensive contact cannot be a defense. The contact can extend to anything related to the person of the plaintiff (e.g. a person’s clothing).

Even if the plaintiff does not suffer actual damage, he can claim nominal damages. It is therefore not necessary to prove that a battery is actually harmful. If a defendant acts intentionally (eg, willfully disregarding a high probability of harm), the plaintiff may seek punitive damages. The defendant can still be held liable for unforeseen consequences according to the “eggshell rule”. For example, if the defendant hit a plaintiff who happened to have hemophilia and bled to death, he or she would be liable for all damages related to the wrongful death.

criminal law

Criminal laws will usually combine the two terms “assault” and “battery” into one crime, “assault”.

See also: Attack and Battery

Battery is an unlawful use of force, directly or indirectly, on another person or their personal property, resulting in bodily harm or abusive contact. Attempting the battery is bodily harm.

As a crime with a general intent, battery does not require a specific male reason. To defend against assault, the accused can prove that he obtained the plaintiff’s consent or that he acted in defense of others or in self-defense, even if the defense is based only on reasonable belief and not on facts.

An aggravated battery is a battery that includes an aggravating circumstance. The liability and sentencing for aggravated battery is usually tougher than that for battery.

prima facie:

The battery prima facie evidence contains 4 components:

Defendant acts Defendant intends to establish contact with victim Defendant’s contact with victim is harmful or offensive Defendant’s contact causes victim to suffer contact that is harmful or offensive

[Last updated July 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team]